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INTRODUCTION

U.S.-style class actions have become a flashpoint for debate over
group litigation and the collective redress regimes emerging around
the world. Everyone wants to develop better ways for consumers and
others who suffer loss from mass harms to receive compensation for
claims that are too small to litigate individually. Everyone wants to
improve the means for encouraging responsible conduct on the part of
those who might cause such harms. But everyone, at least outside the
United States, seems also to agree that they do not want to adopt
U.S.-style class actions in their legal systems.
Despite this widespread agreement, it is difficult to work out the
precise nature of the complaint. What is it about U.S.-style class actions that offends the sensibilities of other legal communities? Could
it be the basic objectives of the procedure, the way in which the class
is represented and the litigation is financed, the kinds of remedies that
are available, or the nature of the court's involvement? And if it is one
*
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or more of these features, is the offending feature integral to the successful operation of a collective redress system, or could it be omitted

or adjusted without impairing the effectiveness of the regime? Finally,
if the concern about U.S.-style class actions is merely a "not-in-mybackyard" objection, is there a means by which alternative procedures

might work cooperatively with U.S. class actions to further the objectives of collective redress elsewhere?
To study these questions,1 proceduralists from other common law

and European countries were asked to report on various aspects of
the collective regimes that have been implemented or contemplated in
their countries and to comment on the compatibility of these regimes
with U.S.-style class actions. Reports were received from Canada,
Australia, England and Wales, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and Swe-

den. They provided remarkable insights into the range of procedural
values that mark the diversity of these legal systems. This paper is
based on the information and analysis provided in those reports.2
The questionnaire on which their reports were based, consisted of
the following six parts.
1. Objectives-Access to justice, judicial economy, and behaviour
modification have been identified as the main objectives of class actions in North America. What would you regard as the key objectives
of group litigation in your legal system? How does group litigation
enhance your civil justice system or how might it do so? How does this
compare to the role played by U.S.-style class actions; and to what
qualities of your civil justice system do you attribute the similarities or
differences?
1. This is by no means the first consideration of these issues. There is a small but rich body
of commentary from a U.S. perspective containing incisive economic and governance analysis of
the perceived concerns of members of other legal systems. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009); John C.
Coffee, Jr. Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288
(2010). This study seeks to go beyond the application of a U.S. perspective on the differences in
approaches to collective regimes by surveying comparatists from those legal systems about specific aspects of collective redress that might shape their perceptions of U.S. class actions.
2. This study was prepared for the International Association of Procedural Law Moscow
Conference "Civil Procedure in Cross-cultural Dialogue" to be held in September 2012 with
proceedings to be published in Russian. National reports from Brazil and the Russian Federation
are also included into that report. The authors of the reports for this study were: Canada- Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic, University of Windsor, Faculty of Law; Australia- Professor Vicki Waye,
Dean of Teaching and Learning, University of South Australia and Professor Vincenzo
Morabito, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University; England and WalesProfessor Rachael Mulheron, Queen Mary University of London; Netherlands- Dr. Helene van
Lith, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam; Italy- Professor Elisabetta Silvestri, Faculty of Law, University of Pavia; Belgium- Dr. Stefaan Voet, Institute for Procedural Law, Ghent University;
Sweden- Professor Per Henrik Lindblom, Uppsala University, Faculty of Law.
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2. Representation-In traditional litigation in the common law,
under the principle of party prosecution, the plaintiff's right to direct
the proceedings serves as a key safeguard of procedural fairness. In
public interest litigation, the law of standing similarly serves to ensure
that the plaintiff or applicant adequately represents the interests of
the public in respect of the issues in dispute. In group litigation, which
determines the interests of claimants who do not participate and who
will be precluded from seeking other relief, it is all the more important
to ensure that the representation is adequate. In your legal system,
what kinds of persons or organizations are eligible or might be considered eligible to represent a group in litigation? How are they selected
and authorized to do so? And what is their role in the litigation?
3. Funding and Financing-Oneof the most controversial features of U.S. class actions is the size of awards for plaintiffs' counsel
fees, and yet, to many Americans considering the alternative of publicly funded regulation of consumer goods and services, the awards
and fees are well-justified. Furthermore, among the various legal systems where group litigation exists, the means by which proceedings
are funded and financed is thought to contribute significantly to the
relative success of the class actions regime. How is group litigation
funded and financed in your legal system, or how might it be funded
and financed if it were introduced? How does or would this economic
model fit with traditional forms of litigation in your country? How
does it contribute or might it contribute to the success of the group
litigation regime?
4. Available Relief-One way in which the objectives of group
litigation depart significantly from traditional litigation is in the kinds
of relief that are thought to constitute a just result. Where making a
plaintiff whole again is thought to serve the interests of compensation
and deterrence in traditional litigation, such an outcome is rarely possible or desirable in group litigation. In some cases, individual recovery of a portion of the loss suffered is regarded as appropriate, in
others, an injunction or a declaration, or some form of alternative or
cy pros result is appropriate. What forms of relief are available in
group litigation in your legal system and how do these achieve-or fail
to achieve-justice?
5. Court Involvement-Mechanisms for court involvement to
safeguard against abuse have evolved over the history of traditional
litigation and are woven into the process, but the modifications necessary to permit group litigation create new risks of abuse. In North
America, judicial involvement at the stages of certification and judg-

512

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18

ment or settlement approval is an important safeguard against abuse.

In group litigation in your legal system, what kinds of court involvement serve this supervisory role, or might serve this role?
6. Compatibility with U.S.-style Class Actions-Based on the

previous questions and any other relevant features of group litigation
as it operates or might operate in your legal system, identify the most
significant challenges to integrating U.S.-style class actions with mechanisms for collective redress in your legal system. How might such
integration affect the culture of dispute resolution and consumer protection in your country? Describe some of the ways in which these
challenges might be addressed to maximize the effectiveness of collec-

tive redress in your country.
II.

ANALYSIS

A.

Overview

In order to appreciate the finer distinctions in the procedures that
have been adopted or proposed in the various legal systems it is helpful to begin with a brief overview of the regimes operating in each
country.' In particular, in assessing the perspectives of other legal systems on U.S.-style class actions, it is important to understand that of
the seven legal systems considered, only two-Canada and Australia-have systems for collective redress that would be described in the
United States as class actions. In no other system for collective redress
may claimants be represented on an opt-out basis in matters in which
the courts can order relief for individual members of the group. What
follows, then, is a brief overview of the most salient features of the
various regimes as a backdrop against which the more specific comparisons can be highlighted.
Canada-Since 1978, legislative regimes for class actions have
been established in all but one Canadian province, and in the Federal
3. The comparative analysis in this paper assumes a basic understanding of the workings of
the class action procedure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, pursuant to which one or more named
plaintiffs may be authorized by a court in a certification motion to sue on behalf of a class
defined in a manner that is approved by the court. In U.S. federal courts and in the majority of
states, the action may be certified to determine one or more legal or factual claims common to
the entire class where: those issues predominate over individual issues; the representative party
or parties will adequately protect the interests of the class; the class is so numerous as to make
individual suits impractical; and the claims are typical of the plaintiffs or defendants. Court approval is also required for the content and method for notices to the class, such as those informing class members of the action and the fact that they will be bound by the result unless they optout. Court approval is also required for the terms of any proposed settlement reached between
the named parties, and for the fees to be paid to plaintiffs counsel, which are typically in excess
of a standard hourly rate and often calculated as a percentage of the award.

20121

CLASS ACTIONS

Court. 4 The legislation is modelled on U.S.-style class actions and,

apart from underlying differences in the legal systems affecting the
operation of the class actions regimes in Canada and the United

States, the regimes have similar objectives and features.
Australia-Similarly, in the Federal Court5 and in the New South
Wales6 and Victoria Supreme Courts7 class actions may be com-

menced on behalf of claimants who may opt-in or opt-out of the proceedings and/or the settlement.8 There are some minor differences,

such as the lack of a certification requirement causing the suitability
for class treatment to be determined on a motion by the defendant

rather than the plaintiff. However, apart from relatively minor differences, like the Canadian class actions regime, the Australian regimes

are similar to that in the U.S. and the primary distinctions in their
operation arise from differences in the underlying civil litigation

process.
England and Wales-Collective redress in England and Wales is
pursued primarily by way of Group Litigation Orders. Group Litigation Orders are case management tools for aggregating claims on an
opt-in basis. They may involve the determination of claims by way of

test cases, 9 generic issues, 10 and trying a series of preliminary issues
based on a set of assumptions. In theory, collective redress may proceed also by way of Representative Actions. However, this is permitted only where claimants have the same interest and more than one
person shares the claim with the representative; 1 and such actions are

often defeated by defendants on the "same interest" criterion.
4. An Act Respecting the Class Action, R.S.Q., c. R-2 (Can. Que); Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-25, arts. 999-1051 (Can. Que.); Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1992, c. 6
(Can. Ont.); Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (Can. B.C.); Class Actions Act, R.S.S.
2001, c. 12.01 (Can. Sask.); Class Actions Act, R.S.N.L. 2001, c. C-18.1 (Can. Nfld.); Rules
Amending the Federal Court Rules, 1998, S.O.R. 98-106 (Can.); The Class Proceedings Act,
C.C.S.M., c. C130 (Can. Man.); Class Proceedings Act, R.S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5 (Can. Alta.); Class
Proceedings Act, R.S.N.S. 2007, c. 28 (Can. N.S.).
5. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA.
6. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 (Austl.).
7. Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) pt 4A (Austl.).
8. In the other State Supreme Courts representative proceedings may be commenced joining the claims of those who have similar interests but the judgment or settlement does not bind
all such persons. See South Australia Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) r 80; Queensland Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 75 (Austl.); Western Australia Rules of the Supreme Court
1971 (WA) 0 18, r 12.
9. Pirelli Cable Holding NV v. Revenue & Customs Comm'rs., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 583,
[2007] All E.R. 408 (Eng. & Wales).
10. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Addison, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 1730, [2003] All E.R. 253
(Eng.).
11. Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, r. 19.6 (U.K.).
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In the English bank charges litigation, which involved numerous

individual matters in the county courts, where the results in one case
were not binding in other cases,1 2 an effort was made to instill order
by deciding a test case,

preme

Court.14

3

which could then be appealed to the Su-

This improved the coherence of the process, but the

decision did not resolve all the outstanding issues, and certain aspects
of the individual cases remained to be determined. The experience
with these cases prompted the development of a proposal for a collective action that was included in the Financial Services Bill 2010.15

Under this proposed regime the court could order either an opt-in or16
an opt-out class action, and the drafting of supporting rules of court.

However, this legislative initiative lapsed in 2010 with the change in
7
government.

1

Netherlands-There are two collective redress regimes for mass
damage in the Netherlands, and they are available in most areas of
law. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Damage

Claims (WCAM) t8 was introduced in 2005 to permit representative
organizations to enter into settlement agreements with allegedly liable
parties and to apply jointly for a declaration by the Amsterdam Court
of Appeal that presumptively binds those covered by its terms on an
opt-out basis. a9 During the pendency of the declaration, all other related proceedings may be suspended.20 The WCAM was designed to
complement U.S. class actions and class settlements by facilitating the
inclusion of class members from outside the U.S., primarily from Europe, who would otherwise be excluded. It has proven to be an effi12. Over 53,000 claims were filed in the English County Courts between March 2006 and
August 2007. the rate of monthly litigation is outlined in Rachael Mulheron, Reform of Collective
Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of Need (Research Paper for the Civil Justice
Council, Feb 2008), section 17), and see, e.g., Brennan v. National Westminster Bank Plc [2007]
EWHC (QB) 2759. [42] (Eng. & Wales).
13. Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc [2008] EWHC (Comm) 875, [2008] 2 All
E.R. 625 (Eng. & Wales).
14. Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc [2009] UKSC 6, [20091 3 W.L.R. 315
(Eng.).
15. Financial Services Act, 2010, §§ 18-25 (U.K.).
16. Financial Services Act, 2010, (U.K.) (proposed CPR 19.1V).
17. This left collective redress to be pursued by way of Group Litigation Orders, thus limiting the predictability of the process and, possibly, the outcome. Multiple Claimants v. SanifoSynthelabo Ltd. [2007] EWHC (QB) 1860 (Eng. & Wales) (regarding the use of the anti-epileptic drug Epilim by pregnant women).
18. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code], bk. 7, art. 907-910 (Neth.); Wetboek van
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [Rv] [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 1013 (Neth.).
19. The agreement may provide for cancellation should too many injured parties opt out.
20. Dutch Arbitration Act [DCCP], art. 1015 (Neth.).
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cient, simple, and relatively inexpensive mechanism of group
21
litigation.
In addition, the Dutch Civil Code provides for a collective right
of action in mass damage cases 22 under which a Dutch foundation or
association incorporated to represent the interests of a group may initiate proceedings to protect the common interests of the group. Available remedies are limited to declaratory judgments and injunctions for
the benefit of interested persons, and the judgment binds only the organization and the defendant. Once a judgment is rendered, interested
parties must initiate separate proceedings to establish the responsible
party's liability to them, along with questions of causality, and the
amount of damages to be awarded to them.
Italy-In 2007, following decades of scholarly debate, legislative
initiatives to introduce class actions began. The financial failures of
large corporations2 3 affecting thousands of investors underscored the
persistent problems of court dockets clogged with individual civil suits
and bankruptcy proceedings. Class actions provisions were incorporated into the Consumer Code 24 and after various revisions came into
effect in 2010 for cases arising after mid-2009. With only six class actions having been brought and one having been declared admissible to
date, the procedure is largely untested and observations on its functioning are necessarily theoretical.
Pursuant to EU Directives, 25 collective actions have been developed for consumer claims and expanded to environmental protection,
securities regulation, anti-discrimination protection, and other areas.
Such actions may be brought only by qualified bodies, such as accredited consumer associations, and these actions may seek only injunctive
relief. However, a new public class action was introduced in 2009 to
permit individuals and groups to apply to the administrative courts for
claims in connection with public bodies that fail to fulfil their official
obligations. The relief available consists of mandatory orders. Damages must be sought separately in the civil courts in individual claims
or in accordance with the class action provision incorporated in the
21. See, e.g., Shell Petroleum, [Hof] [Court of Appeal Amsterdam] May 29, 2009, NJ 2009,
506 (Neth.); Converium, [Hof] [Court of Appeal Amsterdam] Nov. 12, 2010, UN 2010, B03908
(Neth.); confirmed Scor Holding (Switzerland) AG and the Stichting Converium Securities

Compensation Litigation, 17 Jan 2012 [Court of Appeal Amsterdam].
22. BW, bk. 3, art. 305a-c (Neth.).
23. Such as Parmalat, Cirio, and Giacometti.
24. Codice del Consumo [Consumer Code], art. 140 (It.).
25. See, e.g., Council Directive 98/26/CE, 1998 O.J. (L166145) (EU); Council Directive 2009/
22/CE, 2009 O.J. (L110/30) (EU).
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Consumer Code. Despite this range of procedures for vindicating
group rights, the general lack of efficiency in the Italian judicial system is widely thought to represent a major impediment to the protection of group rights.
Belgium-In Belgium, the Judicial Code and Civil Code contain
procedural techniques that are being used for multi-party actions,2 6

including joinder of claims that should be tried together to prevent
contradictory decisions, voluntary or coercive intervention, and party
representation, in which a person (natural or legal) may receive a
mandate from a group of individuals to represent them.2 7 These tech-

niques have been criticized as too cumbersome for large-scale mass
group member's participation must be estabclaims because each
28
lished individually.
As in Italy, there are also a series of legislative initiatives in
Belgium implementing European directives. 29 These regimes permit

private professional, inter-professional or public associations, or organizations that satisfy certain legal criteria3 ° to bring injunctive or preventive actions falling within their statutory objectives (so called
"group actions"). Areas covered include consumer protection, mis26. Piet Taelman & Emilie De Baere, New Trends in Standing and Res ludicata in Collective
Suits (Belgium), in THE XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND
DUTCH REPORTS (A.W. Jongbloed ed., Intersentia 2008).
27. Hubert Bocken & Bernadette Demeulenare, The Defence of Collective Interests in Belgian Civil Procedure, in

EFFECTIVENESS OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION

AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL

161
(Kluwer 1983)(Neth.).
28. Piet Taelman & Stefaan Voet, Belgium and Collective Redress: the Last of the European
ORDER: BELGIAN REPORT AT THE

Mohicans, in

THE BELGIAN

II

REPORTS

INTERNATIONAL

CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW

AT THE CONGRESS OF WASHINGTON

TIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW

OF THE INTERNA-

305, 325 (E. Dirix & Y.H. Leleu eds., Bruylant 2011)

(Belg.).

29. See, e.g., Wet betreffende de intracommunautaire vorderingen tot staking op het gebied
van de bescherming van de consumentenbelangen [Cross Border Injuctions Act] of May 26,
2002, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], July 10, 2002 (Bel.) (implementing Council Directive 98/27/EC, 1998 O.J. (L166/51) (EU) (on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests)). The Anti-Discrimination Acts implemented Council Directive
2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L180/22) (EU) (on equal treatment in employment and occupation);
Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L303/16) (EU) (on equal treatment in employment
and occupation); and Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J. (L373/37) (EU) (on equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, etc. See Wet
van ter bestrijding van bepaalde vormen van discriminatie, [General Non-Discrimination Act] of
May 10, 2007, [BEGLISCH STAATSBLAD] [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 30, 2007
(Belg.); Wet van ter bestrijding van discriminatie tussen vrouwen en mannen, [Gender Act] of
May 10, 2007, [BEGLISCH STAATSBLAD] [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium] May 30, 2007
(BeIg.); Wet van tot wijziging van de wet van 30 juli 1981 tot bestraffing van bepaalde door

racisme of xenofobie ingegeven daden [Racism Act] of May 10, 2007,
[B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium] May 30, 2007 (Belg.).

[BEGLISCH STAATSBLAD]

30. For example, having legal personality for some period, generally three years.
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leading advertising, unfair contract terms and long distance agree-

ments, amicable recovery of consumer debts, environmental harm,
discrimination and racism, and copyright. Such actions are rare because funding is limited, damages cannot be claimed, and the outcome
does not bind the group.

Currently, there is no provision for damages class actions in
which a representative may seek monetary damages on behalf of a
similarly-situated group, the members of which would be bound by
the result. However, three proposals have emerged3 1 : the government 32 has proposed a settlement track regime based on the Dutch
Collective Settlements Act, and a litigation track based on the Quebec
class action; the two Green opposition parties33 have proposed a procedure with a phase for the common issues followed by a phase for
individual issues; and the Flemish Bar Council has proposed a class
action bill. None of these have yet been submitted to Parliament.
Sweden-The Swedish Group Proceedings Act of 2002 (SGPA)
permits group actions in all types of cases in the general courts, including private, organizational and, public group actions. Claims for in-

junctions and for individual damages for group members may be
brought. Group members who have opted-in are bound by the judgment. Although only twelve actions have been commenced in the decade since its introduction, the SGPA has had considerable effect by

increasing the number of claimants, improving the impact of litigation,
and broadening access to justice.34
31. For a thorough analysis of these proposals see Piet Taelman & Stefaan Voet, supra note
28, at 325-342.
32. For example, the minister of Consumer Affairs and the minister of Justice. For an analysis (by the authors of the proposal) see Hakim Boularbah, Des actions groupdes vers l'action de
groupe: quelle valeur ajoutde pour l'avocat?, in LA VALEUR AJOUTPE DE L'AVOCAT. ACrES DU
CONGRtS DE L'O.B.F.G. DU 17 FIVRIER 2011, at 33 (Anthemis 2011) (Bel.); Andrde Puttemans,
L'introduction d'une forme d'action collective en droit beige, in L'ACTION COLLECTIVE OU ACTION DE GROUPE. SE PREPARER A SON INTRODUCTION EN DROIT FRANQAIS ET EN DROIT BELGE

24 (A. Legendre ed., Larcier 2010)(Belg.).
33. Ecolo & Groen!.
34. In Grupptalan mot Skandia v. Fdrsikringsaktiebolaget Skandia [Skandia], 2003-10
T6341 (Swed.) a non-profit organization ("Group Action againstSkandia") was formed in October 2003 to seek a declaration on behalf of 1.2 million policyholders of a subsidiary whose asset
management business had been transferred to the parent company. More than 15,000 people
paid membership dues of about C15 to cover the running expenses of the organization in pursuing the relief. The media coverage was extensive. The proceedings, ultimately through arbitration, were protracted but in time, the company was ordered to pay about C145 million to the
subsidiary, thus indirectly compensating policyholders. The organization said that the relief
would not have been possible if there had been no class action procedure to pursue it. PER
HEINRIK LINDBLOM, NATIONAL REPORT: GROUP LITIGATION IN SWEDEN 22 (Dec. 6, 2007)
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In addition, potential defendants have been given the incentive to
make amends voluntarily and to compensate potential group members. Thus, arguably the most important function of group actions for
individually non-recoverable claims has been preventative through behaviour modification. A feasible opportunity to seek legal redress has
provided considerable incentive to responsible conduct in preventing
and addressing harm.
B.

ParticularFeatures

1. Objectives
There is a considerable agreement among the reports that the
objectives.of group litigation are to advance access to justice, judicial
economy, and behavior modification. However, the differences in the
way in which these objectives are weighted and described reveal each
legal system's particular aspirations for meeting the challenges of providing for collective redress.
Access to justice has particular significance among common law
regimes, in which claimants ordinarily must finance the prosecution of
their claims, including developing and presenting the facts to the
court. The obstacles faced by their civil law counterparts are different
in that the courts are primarily responsible for investigating the facts
and compiling the record, reducing the expense faced for individual
claimants. In those countries, the improvements in access to justice
tend to be more closely related to easing the burden on courts whose
dockets would otherwise be clogged by large numbers of individual
matters that could be aggregated.
Among common law countries, improving judicial economy may
be more prevalent a concern in the United States, where lawyers may
carry inventories of similar claims in areas of the law that in some
other countries are processed in administrative tribunals. In those
countries, class actions made in cases of individually, economically
non-viable claims may actually serve to increase, rather than reduce
the caseload for the courts.35 In these situations, access to justice is
(Swed.) available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/SwedenNationalReport.pdf
35. Nevertheless, such claims would need to be distinguished from those described in the
U.S. as negative value claims in that the threshold for viability in other legal systems may be
much higher than in the U.S. where contingency fees have long been a regular feature of namedparty litigation and claimants do not ordinarily face the prospect of paying a defendant's attorneys fees if they are unsuccessful.
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improved, but the gains in judicial economy in aggregating claims that
would not otherwise be brought is less obvious.
However, a related concern for consistency can arise from the
need to resolve large numbers of claims raising the same issues in situations or legal systems where stare decisis does not apply. For example, as mentioned, this concern arises in the county courts in England
for claims that are not subject to binding precedent from higher judicial authority and, of course, it arises in civil law jurisdictions where
the doctrine of stare decisis does not operate.
Nevertheless, it may safely be said that the objective of behavior
modification is the most controversial of the objectives and there has
been considerable debate in civil law and common law countries alike
over the extent to which civil litigation undertaken by private persons
should serve this function. This is not a feature of logistical differences
between common law and civil law procedure, or even between the
traditions of individual legal systems so much as it is an important
feature of American exceptionalism.
In the following descriptions of the objectives of collective redress in the various legal systems surveyed, it is interesting to see the
commitment to ensuring that class actions enhance the effectiveness
of collective redress within the civil justice system without altering or
interfering with what are understood to be the core procedural values
of each system.
Canada-In 1978, with the rise in public law litigation36 and the
hope that private Attorneys General could use class actions to fill the
gaps in regulatory enforcement, Quebec passed class action legislation.3 7 Soon after, in 1982, the Ontario Law Reform Commission published a three-volume report recommending the enactment of
legislation in Ontario.3 8 The Report recognized the increasingly complex and interdependent nature of society resulting from "mass manufacturing, mass promotion, and mass consumption" and the fact that
the activities of major corporations, international conglomerates, and
36. Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to
Make Rights Effective: A GeneralReport in I ACCESS TO JUSTICE 36 (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth
eds., Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1979); See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976).
37. See W.A. Bogart, Questioning Litigation'sRole: Courts and Class Actions in Canada 62
IND. L.J. 665 (1986-87); Catherine Piche, The Cultural Analysis of Class Action Law 2 LSU L.
CTR. J. Civ. L. STUD. 101, 118 (2009); Shaun Finn, In a Class All Its Own: The Advent of the
Modern Class Action and Its Changing Legal and Social Mission, 2 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV.
333, 352-353 (2005) (Can.).
38. ONT. LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS (1982) (Can.).
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big government can be affecting and possibly causing injury to large
numbers of people. 39 Bearing in mind that "the individual is very
often unable or unwilling to stand alone in meaningful opposition,"40
class actions could serve an important function in promoting access to
justice. "By affording 'an opportunity for voicing mass grievances in
an orderly fashion within the framework of the existing 'judicial' system,' [class actions] may provide an antidote to the social frustration
that exists where neither courts nor administrative agencies are able
to protect the rights of citizens on an individual basis."41
Access to justice, judicial economy and behavior modification
were the three principal justifications for recommending that Ontario
enact class proceedings legislation. The Report noted that "many
claims are not individually litigated, not because they are lacking in
merit or unimportant to the potential claimant, but because of economic, social, and psychological barriers."'4 It was hoped that class
actions could help to overcome these barriers and, in this way, perform an important function in society.
When the legislation was passed in 1992, both the access to justice
and the regulatory functions were acknowledged. According to the
Attorney General of Ontario, there was more to the initiative than
access to justice: "Representative plaintiffs [. . .] serve in effect as
some sort of private attorneys general to attack what they consider to
be shoddy workmanship, environmental banditry[,] or corporate skulduggery [... ] [in this] cost-effective way to promote private enforce-

ment and thereby to take some of the pressure off enforcement by the
budget-restrained government ministries." 43 Despite this, the regulatory function of class actions has received less recognition than the
access to justice benefits;" and class actions have far more commonly

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 139.
43. I. Scorr & N. MCCORMICK, To MAKE A DIFFERENCE: A MEMOIR 182 (Stoddart 2001),
(as cited in Hon. I. Binnie, Mr. Attorney Ian Scott and the Ghost of Sir Oliver Mowat, 22 ADVOC.
Soc'Y J. 4 (Spring 2004) (Can.).
44. The Supreme Court of Canada referred to class actions as having a "social dimension"
in Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 at para. 106 (Can.). In
Alfresh Beverages Can. Corp. v Hoescht AG (2002), CarswellOnt 77, [2002] 16 C.P.C. 5th 301
(Can. Ont.), the Ontario Superior Court stated at paragraph 16 that "the private class action
litigation bar functions as a regulator in the public interest for public policy objectives." However, explicit acknowledgments of the class action's broader public policy function are rare.
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been described as serving the tripartite role of access to justice, judicial economy, and behaviour modification.45
Australia-As in Canada, the main objective of group litigation
in Australia is understood as improving access to justice by permitting
matters with high ratios of litigation cost to claim size to be aggregated so as to overcome the disproportionately high cost of litigating

individual claims.46 Still, as in Canada, the procedure also supports
regulatory objectives4 7 by promoting consumer protection, efficient

markets, and a better environment through the initiation of largely
privately funded and privately driven litigation.4 8 This is particularly

true in areas where gaps in regulatory action will leave harm undercompensated and where the internalization of such harm by
wrongdoers will enhance deterrence.
England and Wales-Group litigation in England and Wales has
been described as having six objectives: proportionality; predictability;
access to justice; judicial and wider economy; (to a lesser extent) deterrence; and fairness.
Proportionality,an overriding objective for all litigation under the
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR),4 9 requires the allotment of an appropriate share of the court's resources to each case taking into account the
need to allot resources to other cases. 50 For example, in an appropriate case, the requirement of proportionality may warrant the recom-

45. Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton (Dutton), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 28
(Can.). The extent to which these objectives are realized through class actions has been considered by Jasminka Kalajdzic in Accessing Justice: Appraising Class Actions Ten Years After Dutton, Hollick & Rumley 53 Sup. CT. L. REV. 2d 3 (2011) available at http://www.uwindsor.ca/law/
kalajj/system/files/Introduction- %2OKalajdzic.pdf (Can.).
46. ACCESS TO JUST. TASKFORCE, A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
THE FEDERAL CIVIL SYSTEM 114 (2009)(Austl.), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/
A%20Strategic%20Framework%20for%20Access%20to%20Justice%20in%20the%2OFederal
%20Civil%20Justice%20System%20%2OReport%20of%20the%20Access%20to%20Justice
%20Taskforce.pdf; Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 Nov. 1991, 3174

(Michael Duffy, Att'y Gen.) (Austl.);
IN THE FEDERAL COURT: REPORT NO.

AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, GROUPED PROCEEDINGS

46, at 13 (1988).

47. Bernard Murphy & Camille Cameron, Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class Action Litigation in Australia, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 399, 404 (2006) (Austl.).
48. See id.; CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS 13 (John Sorabji et al. eds., 2008) (Eng. & Wales), available at http://www.lawcentres.
org.uk/uploads/ImprovingAccess toJusticethrough-Collective Actions.pdf.
49. See Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, r. 1.1(1), (2)(c) (U.K.).
50. CPR r. 1.1(2)(e).
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mendation that claimants participate in an opt-in Group Litigation
Order rather than pursue a representative action.5 '
Predictabilityis an obvious benefit of aggregating claims that otherwise could follow a myriad of courses producing a range of outcomes, and which could be subjected to different case management
strategies by the courts. The 2010 legislative initiative to establish a
class action regime would have furthered this objective under the
Group Litigation Orders regime, but the initiative lapsed with the
change in government.
Access to Justice, was named by Lord Woolf in his 1996 Report as
one of three key principles underpinning any new regime of collective
redress, "where large numbers of people have been affected by another's conduct, but individual loss is so small that it makes an individual action economically unviable."5 2 The Court of Appeal has also
noted that the importance of efforts to permit viable actions to be
brought in situations where claimants would find it prohibitively expensive to bring individual proceedings.5 3
Judicial, and wider, economy, also named as a key principle by
Lord Woolf, would be served by a procedure that could "provide expeditious, effective[,] and proportionate methods of resolving cases,
where individual damages are large enough to justify individual action
but where the number of claimants and the nature of the issues involved mean that the cases cannot be managed satisfactorily in accor51. Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways Pic, [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch) 741 [381, [2010]
Ch. 48 (claim for price fixing against airlines), affd, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1284, [2011] Ch. 354
(Eng. & Wales) (claim for price-fixing against airlines); see Taylor v. Nugent Care Soc'y, [2004]
EWCA (Civ) 51 [22], [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1129 (Eng.) (proportionality referred to in the Group
Litigation Order). But see Millharbour Mgmt. Ltd. v. Weston Homes Ltd., [2011] EWHC (TCC)
661 [22(6)], [2011] 3 All E.R. 1027 (Eng.) (proportionality militated in favour of a representative
action.
52.

SIR HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR

ch. 17, para. 2 (1996) (Gr. Brit.). (According to the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales: "A civil justice system: 1. should be
just in the results it and they deliver; 2. should be fair and be seen to be fair; 3. should ensure
ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES

litigants have an equal opportunity, regardless of their resources, to assert or defend their legal

rights; 4. should ensure that every litigant has an adequate opportunity to state his or her own
case and answer their [sic] opponent's; 5. should treat like cases alike (and conversely treat
different cases differently); 6. should deal with cases efficiently and economically, in a way which
is comprehensible to those using the civil justice system and which provides litigants with as

much certainty as the litigation permits; and do so within a system best organised to realise these
principles .... It is these principles, which reflect Lord Woolf's commitment to procedural justice
now being as important as substantive justice, which guide the Civil Justice Council in making its
recommendations [for collective redress reform]) CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 910.
53. Afrika v Cape plc [2001] EWCA Civ 2017, para. 1.

20121

CLASS ACTIONS

dance with normal procedure."5 4 The potential benefit 55of this feature
of the proceedings to defendants has also been noted.
Deterrence, though only a by-product of achieving compensation
for class members, is an important ancillary consequence of effective
private enforcement. Accordingly, the Office of Fair Trading and the
European Commission, 56 and the U.K. government 7 have acknowledged that private actions by victims in competition law are a necessary complement to public enforcement efforts, as they broaden the
scope of cases that can be investigated; they promote greater awareness of competition law; and they reinforce deterrence.
Fairness was also emphasized by Lord Woolf's report, which acknowledged that collective redress should "achieve a balance between
the normal rights of claimants and defendants, to pursue and defend
cases individually, and the interests of a group of parties to litigate the
action as a whole in an effective manner., 58 The Civil Justice Council
Report in 2008 emphasized that fairness remains a valid benchmark
when considering any collective actions reform and design for the
jurisdiction.5 9
Netherlands-The WCAM procedure promotes access to justice
and judicial economy by enabling Dutch claimants to benefit from the
results of foreign class actions (typically in the United States) and to
enable them and the defendants to avoid re-litigation of the claim. In
addition, the WCAM seeks to promote finality or legal certainty by
providing for judicial declarations of the parties' rights and obligations
in respect of the matters in which settlements are approved.60 To the
54. WOOLF, supra note 52; see Emerald Supplies, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1284 [4] (Eng. &
Wales).

55.

CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 48.

56. Id. at 60, 69.
57. HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, BUDGET 2007, H.C. 342,
TICE COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 50 n.82.

3.45 (U.K.), cited in CIVIL JUS-

58. WOOLF, supra note 52; see Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I.1998/3132 r.
1.1(2)(a), (d) (U.K.).
59. CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 48, 43.
60.

See HELENE VAN LITH, THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE IN-

TERNATIONAL LAW (Maklu Publishers 2011) (2010) (Neth.); M.B.M. Loos, EVALUATION OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS
UNION-COUNTRY

IN THE EUROPEAN

REPORT THE NETHERLANDS (Frank Alleweldt et al. eds., 2008) (Neth.),

available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress-cons/nl-country-report-final.pdf;
VAN TOELICHTING [EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE

WCAM],

MEMORIE

KAMERSTUKKEN

II 2003-

04, 29 414, no. 3 (Neth.); THE DUTCH CLASS ACTION (FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT) ACT (WCAM)
(Neth.), available at www.rijksoverheid.nl; I.N. Tzankova; Financiering en kosten van massaclaims: legal realism. Ofwel: wat kunnen we leren van de Engelsen (en van andere common law
landen)?, in MASSACLAIMS: CLASS ACTIONS OPZ'N NEDERLANDS 171-204 (Stichting Mordenate

College ed., Ars Aequi Libri 2007) (Neth.); I.N. TZANKOVA, NATIONAL REPORT: THE NETHER-
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extent the WCAM provides compensation that is not otherwise obtainable, it has been regarded as found money and few if any interested parties have opted-out. Execution of settlements and the
payment of compensation have encountered few problems and the
process has succeeded in providing closure for the parties responsible.
Behaviour modification has been understood to be a by-product
and not a main objective of the WCAM, and the WCAM has succeeded in promoting collective negotiation instead of confrontation in
a collective litigation procedure. The WCAM was inspired by the fact
that collective settlements have enabled collective redress in mass
damage cases in the United States, but the WCAM seeks to promote
this process without court intervention and outside the process of a
pending class action brought to the court. It seeks to change the way
that negotiations are carried out by enabling them to be based on the
idea of dialogue instead of confrontation in court proceedings.
Italy-The main objective of the class action procedure under
the Italian Consumer Code is to enhance access to justice. The right to
sue to protect one's rights under civil and administrative law is predicated on the principle of equality, which is a fundamental tenet of the
Italian Constitution.61 With the growth in mass harms, the lack of
means of collective redress was seen to represent a major deficiency in
the implementation of these guarantees. With the inclusion of collective redress in the Consumer Code, this gap has been filled for consumers of goods and services. It is too early to tell whether group
litigation will also serve the purpose of behaviour modification and
deterrence.
Belgium-The existing Belgian procedures for group litigation
fall short of the objectives of access to justice, judicial economy, and
behaviour modification.62 The procedural techniques of joinder, inter-

LANDS: PART 11 (2008), (Neth.) available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/documents/NetherlandsNational_Report_2.pdf; Tomas Arons & Willem H. van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim Settlements from the Netherlands, 21
EUR. Bus. L. REV. 857, 865-66 (2010) (Neth.); Helene van Lith, Case note Converium, ONDERNEMINGSRECH 3, 117-21 (2011) (Neth.); W.M. Schonewille, De financiering van collectieve
acties, ONDERNEMINGSRECHT 137 (2010) (Neth.).

61. See art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (providing that "[aill citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political
opinion, personal and social conditions"); id. art. 24, § 1 (providing that "anyone may bring cases
before a court of law in order to protect their rights under civil and administrative law").
62. These objectives, which were based on ONT. LAw REFORM COMM'N, supra note 38, at
117 (Can.), were summarized in Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 at para. 27-29.
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vention, and party representation seek to enhance judicial economy,"
but they require each claimant to opt-in. Accordingly, the procedures

are ineffective for individually non-recoverable claims and their effectiveness in other claims is impaired by the fact that they do not prevent a multiplicity of group proceedings.64 The existing procedures for
group actions also fall short of these objectives because they do not

permit claims for damages and so serve only the objective of deterrence. Neither the traditional procedural techniques, nor the existing
group actions regimes create credible access to justice for victims of a
mass harm. The current class action proposals seek to remedy this.

Sweden-Despite the relatively few group proceedings commenced to date, with the publicity surrounding ongoing and upcoming
trials,6 5 group litigation has proved effective in promoting access to

justice and behavior modification. Judicial lawmaking and precedentbuilding 66 occur mainly in public and organization group actions
brought by strong and established agencies and non-profit organizations, but private group actions may also produce these results. Moreover, group actions promote legal policy debate and ethical/moral
discourse that can result in important changes to the law. While defendants initially try to avoid group actions, such actions provide closure by binding every member of the group. Group actions also have a
potential to contribute to judicial economy, particularly in individually
recoverable cases.6 7
63.

CHARLES VAN REEPINGHEN, MINISTERIE VAN JUSTITIE, VERSLAG OVER DE GERECHTE-

LUKE HERVORMING 327 (1964) (BeIg.).
64. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397-398 (1967); AUSTL. LAW
REFORM COMM'N, GROUPED PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURT: REPORT NO. 46, at 107
(1988).
65. On the role of courts and functions of civil procedure in Sweden, see LINDBLOM, supra
note 34 (in English).
66. This refers to judicial review and judicial control of consistency of national law with EU
law.
67. See Ozum v. Sweden, Tingsratt [TR] [Uppsala District Court] 2008 T3897 (Swed.), affd,
Hovratt [HovR] [Svea Court of Appeals] (Swed.). A quota rule was applied to admissions to the
veterinary medicine program at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala that
gave the underrepresented gender among applicants (currently male students) a better chance of
being admitted to the program. In a private group action in July 2008, the plaintiff claimed
damages in total of 4.6 million Swedish kronor (about C500,000) for herself and 46 other female
students who were not admitted. The plaintiff was represented by the Centre for Justice Foundation (Centrum fdr riittvisa), which had undertaken to pay the plaintiff's litigation costs. Through
the Office of the Chancellor of Justice, the State declared that it had no objections to trying the
case as a group action. The Uppsala District Court decided in September 2008 to hear the case as
a group action and ordered the Swedish state in a final judgment to pay 35,000 Swedish kronor
(about C3,500) to the plaintiff and each member of the group, for a total of 1.6 million Swedish
kronor (C160,000). The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Svea Hovratt).
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Representation

Important distinctions exist between the approaches taken in the
various legal systems to representing claimants. In general, in the
common law, there is a well-established tradition of individual claimants framing and prosecuting their own claims in consultation with
their legal advisors. Under the principle of party prosecution claimants themselves are thought to be in the best position to assess their
own needs and to exercise judgment in resolving in the way that best
achieves this result. This provides a basis for public confidence in the
prospect of permitting an individual claimant advised by counsel to
represent the interests of other similarly situated claimants, subject to
the right of class members to opt out.
In contrast, in the civil law, where the courts have primary responsibility for directing the case, the lack of a tradition of party-prosecution can limit public confidence in the ability of individual
claimants who have suffered the harm for which redress is sought to
direct the litigation. In the civil law, community organizations, or ideological plaintiffs, may be thought better able to meet the challenges of
advocating on behalf of the class. In those countries, the debates centre on whether established community organizations alone should be
permitted to represent claimants or whether associations created for
the purpose of pursuing the litigation should also be permitted to represent claimants, and on how the capacity of such organizations applying to serve as representatives should be determined.
For U.S. lawyers, the prospect of casting a community organization in the role of representative plaintiff could give rise to agency
concerns and suspicion of the potential for capture. Professors Issacharoff and Miller noted that:
The interests of nonprofit consumer organizations may reflect ideological considerations that may not necessarily coincide with the economic interests of consumers. [. . .] This potential for distorted
representation as a result of a distinct policy agenda is not as worrisome in U.S. class action litigation, where the class is usually represented by attorneys whose interests are in obtaining a fee, not in
changing the world. 68
Even within the common law, interesting differences in approach
have emerged among legal systems. In part, this is a product of the
simple fact that, despite the principle of party prosecution, the claimant is not representing his or her own interests alone, but also the
68. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 1, at 194.
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interests of a group of persons who, apart from the similarities between their claims, may have little in common. In Australia, this
prompted legislators to abandon the pretense of party prosecution directed by a claimant and to impose instead a fiduciary duty on class
counsel to serve the interests of the class. The representative plaintiff
in the Australian systems serves more as an example of the harm suffered as a means of providing a factual substratum for the assessment
of the claim than as the person responsible for determining the direction of the litigation.
The Australian and civil law approaches contrast with the approach taken in the United States in which a responsible representative plaintiff, capable of exercising judgment independently from
counsel, is seen as an important safeguard against the risk of harm to
the interests of the class that might result from the inherent conflicts
of interest faced by class counsel. Despite the acknowledged potential
for conflicts of interest between the representative plaintiff and other
members of the class,6 9 solutions have been sought in ensuring that
the representative plaintiff is at least a plaintiff with a material interest
in the litigation.70
It is interesting to see in the following commentaries how the
common concerns relating to questions such as the representatives'
dedication to the welfare of the class representative's capacity to instruct counsel effectively give rise to such different solutions from one
legal system to another.
Canada-Inorder to be certified as a class action, the plaintiffs in
a proceeding must have a representative who is able to "fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class." 71 Adequacy of the
representative will usually be determined as a function of the plaintiff's motivation to prosecute the claim, the ability to bear the costs of
the litigation, and the competence of the plaintiffs' counsel.7 2
Motivation per se may be difficult to assess, but a representative
plaintiff must at least have "an interest the same as others in the class"
and not be impecunious.7 3 In theory, any legal person with a direct
69. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Self-Interest, Public Interest, and the Interests of the Absent Client:

Legal Ethics and Class Action Praxis, 49 OsGooODE HALL L.J. 1, 11-12 (2011) (Can.).
70. See id. at 25-26 (citing Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2006)). In addition, while the legislation refers to a representative plaintiff, this function is often
supported by a committee of plaintiffs.
71. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1992, c. 6 § 5(1)(e)(i) (Can. Ont.).
72. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, para. 41.
73. Smith v. Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd. (1995), 22 O.R. 3d 433, para. 63 (Can. Ont.
Gen. Div.), aff'd, 26 O.R. 3d 94 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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cause of action may serve as a representative plaintiff. Most representative plaintiffs are individuals, but where corporations are permitted
to serve in this capacity, the law imposes restrictions.7 4 In Quebec,
consumer organizations have served as representatives, but this is rare
elsewhere in Canada.
Most representative plaintiffs are recruited by class action lawyers.7 5 This practice is controversial: practitioners regard it necessary
to promote access to justice, but academics and judges doubt whether
it promotes effective oversight of counsel.7 6 A representative plaintiff
recruited by a lawyer based on the lawyer's research of a potential
claim may lack of the necessary interest, independence, and incentive
to fulfill his or her duties to the class to exercise independent judgment in instructing counsel. 77 Nevertheless, in some cases the plaintiffs' recruitment and limited contact with counsel has not resulted in
disqualification.78 Once the representative plaintiff has been approved
by the certification judge he or she has the power to instruct, hire, and
fire counsel, and the duty to act in the best interests of the class. 79 The
extent of the involvement of representative plaintiffs varies considerably from case to case. 0
Australia-In Australia, class actions are generally pursued by
specialist law firms, but few are large enough to underwrite and man74. See Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, arts. 999, 1048 (Can. Que.) (providing that
a legal person established for a private interest, partnership, or association may apply for the
status of representative if one of its designated members is a member of the group that intends
to bring a class action, and the interest of that member is linked to the objects for which the legal
person or association has been constituted).
75. Data collected in a small-scale survey reflects the class action activity of approximately

77 class action lawyers, working in thirteen firms, who reported between them a total of 332 class
actions as at January 1, 2009. None of the four firms with the largest portfolio of class actions
(over 40 cases each) attributed more than twenty five percent of their cases as having been
initiated by a client who sought legal advice from the firm. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Access to Justice
for the Masses? A Critical Analysis of Class Actions in Ontario (2009) (LLM thesis, University
of Toronto), available at https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream1807/18780/6/KalajdzicJas-

minka_200911_LLMThesis.pdf.
76. See Kalajdzic, supra note 69; Catherine Piche, The Class Action Settlement Actors: Who

Protects Whom?, 23 Sup. CT. L REV. 2d 57 (2011) (Can.).
77. Chartrand v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2008 BCSC 1781, paras. 96-112 (Can. B.C.); Singer v.
Schering-Plough Can. Inc., 2010 ONSC 42, paras. 221 (Can. Ont.); Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. of
Can. (2006), 35 C.P.C. 6th 264, paras. 85-95, 105 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), aff d, [2008 O.J. No.
4153 (Can. Ont. Div. Ct.) (plaintiff, who was described as a "pawn" by counsel who recruited
him, was ultimately found not to be an adequate representative).
78. Fantl v. Transamerica Life Can. (1998), 66 C.P.C. 6th 203, paras. 26-40 (Can. Ont. Div.
Ct.), af-fd, 2009 ONCA 377 (Can. Ont.).
79. Fantl, 2009 ONCA 377, paras. 48-74.
80. Kalajdzic, Legal Ethics and Class Action Praxis, supra note 69.
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age large scale group proceedings. 8 ' A minimum of seven claimants
must instruct a firm8 2 in order to commence a class action.83 The firm
acts on their instructions, but it owes fiduciary duties to all group

members' and it must protect the interests of the class in the event of
a conflict between the class and the representative claimants. Related

class actions are common place,8 5 accounting for nearly half of the
representative proceedings filed in the Federal Court of Australia,8 6

with nearly one-third commenced by different law firms.87 In one
case, following the court-ordered formation of an independently selected litigation committee to determine how to proceed in the88 best
interests of the group, all the proceedings were heard together.
Individuals, corporations, trade unions, incorporated associations
and local government councils may all serve as representatives. 89
Their interests need not be identical with the class members' interests
provided their claims have substantial common issues of law and
fact. 90 However, each representative and each class member must
have a claim against each of the defendants. 9' Class representatives
81. Vicki Waye & Vince Morabito, The Dawning of the Age of the Litigation Entrepreneur,
28 Civ. JUST. 0. 389, 425 (2009) (U.K.). Between 1992 and 2009, roughly one-third of all class
actions commenced in the Federal Court were filed by two law firms, who were the only firms to
be involved in more than ten such proceedings. See VINCE MORABITO, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
AUSTRALIA'S CLASS ACTION REGIMES, FIRST REPORT: CLASS ACTION FACTS AND FIGURES 28

(2009).
82. Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty. Ltd. (No. 1) [2011] VSC 167, paras. 44-46 (Austl.).
83. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33C(1)(a); Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s
33C(1)(a) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 157(1)(a) (Austl.).
84. Petrusevski v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd. [2003] FCA 1056, para 7 (Austl.); King
v AG Austl. Holdings Ltd. (2002) 121 FCR 480, 488-89 (Austl.); Courtney v Medtel Pty. Ltd.
(2002) 122 FCR 168, 182, 184-85 (Austl.); McMullin v ICI Austl. Operations Pty. Ltd. [1997] No
NG 305 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 27 Nov. 1997) (Austl.) cited in King, 121 FCR at 482.
85. See VINCE MORABITO, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA'S CLASS ACTION REGIMES, SECOND REPORT: LITIGATION FUNDERS, COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS, Olr OUT RATES,
VICTORIAN CLASS ACTIONS AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES

21 (2010).

86. Id. at 22.

87. See id.
88. Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd. [2008] FCA 1505, paras 9-12, 39 (Austl.).
89.

MORABITO, supra note 85, at 45.

90. E.g., Williams v FAI Home Sec. Pty. Ltd. (No 2) [2000] FCA 726, para 12 (Austl.); Rod
Inv. Pty. Ltd. v Clark (No 2) [2006] VSC 342, para 53 (Vic.) (Austl.); Woodcroft-Brown v
Timbercorp Sec. Ltd. [2010] VSC 68, paras 14-17 (Austl.).
91. Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd. v Nixon (2000) 170 ALR 487, para 3 (Austl.). However in
Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. (2003) 200 ALR 607, paras 122-30, 246-48 (Austl.), a majority
of the Full Court of the Federal Court said (in obiter) (at 630-631, [122]-[130] per Carr J and at
657-659, [246]-[248] per Finkelstein J) that they considered Philip Morris was wrongly decided
on this point. Nevertheless, Philip Morris has been largely followed. E.g., Cook v Pasminco (No
2) (2000) 107 FCR 44, 46 (Austl.); Johnstone v HIH Ins. Ltd. [2004] FCA 190, para 38 (Austl.);
Rod Inv. [2006] VSC 342; Kirby, [2008] FCA 1505, paras 175-76 (Austl.).
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must have standing to bring their own claims,9 2 but they are not agents
or fiduciaries of class members. 93 It is the class lawyers who interact
with class members and who have this responsibility. This has
prompted commentators to question the need for representatives. 94

Representatives can be removed if they do not adequately represent
group's interests, 95 and class members can opt
isfied with the conduct of the proceedings.

out 9 6

if they are dissat-

Most class actions are commenced by private parties, but the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)9 7 and
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) 98 were
authorized in 2001 to commence proceedings in the public interest on
behalf of persons who have been harmed and who have provided their
written consent to this representation.9 9 This power was meant to re-

dress the difficulties of pursuing expensive and complicated litigation,'00 but it was not exercised. "° ' From 1992-2009 only 15 out of 241
applications commenced in the Federal Court of Australia were filed
by the ACCC and the ASIC,'1 2 who preferred to leave it to private
parties to assess the costs and benefits of litigation.10 3
In 2010, the ACCC and the ASIC were given authority to com-

mence actions without written consent following a judicial declaration
92. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33D; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33D
(Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 158 (Austl.). Moreover, these provisions allow a
class representative who has commenced proceedings to maintain those proceedings even
though he or she ceases to have a claim against the defendant.
93. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33E; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33E
(Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 159 (Austl.).
94. DAMIAN B. GRAVE & KENNETH A. ADAMS, CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA 131-32
(2005).
95. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 33T; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33T
(Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 171 (Austl.).
96. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s s33J; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33J
(Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 162 (Austl.).
97. The ACCC carries out these broad functions using an array of statutory powers conferred by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.).
98. Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1 (2).
99. See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87 (1B) (Austl.); Australian Securities
and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 50.
100. Austl. Sec. Comm'n v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1996) 70 FCR 93, 115 (Austl.); Somerville v Austl. Sec. Comm'n (1995) 60 FCR 319, 324 (Austl.).
101. Janet Austin, Does the Westpoint Litigation Signal a Revival of the ASIC Section 50
Class Action, 22 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 8 (2008).
102. VINCE MORABITO, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA'S CLASS ACTION REGIMES:
FIRST REPORT: CLASS ACTION FACTS AND FIGURES 28 (2009).
103. ASIC Regulatory Guide 4, 1991 (Cth) reg 4.4 (Austl.); ACCC Compliance and Enforcement Policy 2012 (Cth) 2 (Austl.) (The ACCC is more likely to act in cases of egregious breaches
of national and international significance involving important interpretations of law than in cases
involving the private commercial rights of the parties).

2012]

CLASS ACTIONS

that a respondent had breached statutory prohibitions against unconscionable behaviour or misleading and deceptive conduct, or had

taken advantage of consumers through unfair contract terms. 10 4 In
such actions, the courts do not award damages, 10 5 but they are authorized to make various orders, including declaring a term of a contract
or a whole contract void; varying standard form contracts; directing
refunds or the return of property; or mandating the supply of services.
The orders are binding on non-party consumers who accept the re-

dress from the respondent acting at the direction of the court.
Enforceable undertakings falling within the array of powers belonging to these regulators can lead to the initiation of other forms
collective of redress.10 6 These powers include issuing public warning
notices10 7 and infringement notices. 10 8 They are not litigious, but they
can augment group litigation. Privately initiated group proceedings for
compensation relying upon a finding in an action taken by a regulator

may precede, follow, or operate in tandem with regulatory action.
For example, in the Multiplex dispute, a 2005 ASIC investigation
of misleading and deceptive conduct by an international construction
company culminated in an enforceable undertaking to establish a $32
million compensation fund for investors, to undertake an independent
review of disclosure policies and practices, and to implement any recommendations that resulted. 0 9 A class action followed and it was
eventually settled" 0 for many times what the investors would have
104. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 239 (Austl.); Australian Securities and
Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12GNB.
105. Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) sch 2 pt 7. The
omission of damages awards may be a response to the ruling in Georgiadis v Austl. & Overseas
Telecomm. Corp. (1994) 179 CLR 297 (Austl.) that an action for dalihages is a proprietary right
that may be extinguished only on just terms under AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxxi) or that
the proceeding was developed to fill a gap in regulatory incentive where the damages were not
large, which is consistent with ASIC's ability to recover compensation as an adjunct to its power
to seek civil penalties pursuant to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317H, 1317HA (Austl.) and
the regulator's power to seek compensation on behalf of consumers as a component of an enforceable undertaking.
106. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87B (Austl.); Australian Securities and
Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 93AA.
107. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 51ADA (Austl.); Australian Securities and
Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12GLC.
108. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317DAC (Austl.); Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth) s 134A (Austi.).
109. 06-443 ASIC accepts an enforceable undertakingfrom the Multiplex Group, AUSTL. SEC.
INV. COMM'N (Dec. 20, 2006), www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsflbyheadline/06-443+ASIC+accepts+
an+enforceable+undertaking+from+the+Multiplex+Group?openDocument.
110. P Dawson Nominees Pty. Ltd. v Brookfield Multiplex Ltd. (No. 4) [2010] FCA 1029
(Austl.).
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received if they had accepted the terms of the original ASIC settlement.111 Similarly, in the Amcor/Visy settlement, an ACCC application for pecuniary penalties under the Trade PracticesAct 1974 (Cth)
1 12
for a price fixing and market sharing agreement, resulted in a fine
and was followed by a class action on behalf of businesses that purchased their product within the period under investigation.' 13 Finally,
in the Opes Prime litigation, a securities lending and stockbroking
firm extended loans to investors that were secured by their shares,
often having much greater value than the loans." 4 The shares were
transferred to Opes Prime's financiers, two leading banks. When the
securities firm went bankrupt, the banks seized the shares, and ASIC
launched an investigation into allegations that the firm and its bankers
had been promoting an unregistered management investment scheme.
A class action was started on behalf of the investors and, following an
ASIC initiated mediation, a global settlement was reached in which a
scheme of arrangement required the banks to pay
the liquidators a
1 5
investors.1
by
recovery
some
permitted
sum that
To date, there has been little public debate over the balance between publicly and privately initiated class actions despite the substantial transaction costs of private class actions in legal fees and litigation
financier premiums 16 and a report on Australia's Access to Justice
Framework in 2009.117

Englandand Wales-In the English civil justice system, there has
been considerable debate over whether ideological plaintiffs should
be permitted to represent claimant groups in litigation. The Group
Litigation Order regime requires a litigant with a direct cause of action to pursue the claim rather than an entity that represents the inter111. Ben Butler, ASIC attacked on Multiplex deal, THE AGE (Australia), July 22, 2010, available at http://www.theage.com.au/business/asic-attacked-on-multiplex-deal-20100721-1018a.htmi.
112. Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n v Visy Indus. Holdings Pty. Ltd. (No. 3)
(2007) 244 ALR 673.
113. Jarra Creek Cent. Packing Shed Pty. Ltd. v Amcor [2011] FCA 671, para 6 (Austl.).
114. See, e.g., Beconwood Sec. Pty. Ltd. v Austl. & N.Z. Banking Grp. Ltd. (2008) 246 ALR
361 (Austl.).
115. Fowler v Lindholm (2009) 178 FCR 563 (Austl.).
116. VINCE MORABITO, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA'S CLASS ACTION REGIMES,
SECOND REPORT: LITIGATION FUNDERS, COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS, OPT OUT RATES, VICTORIAN CLASS ACTIONS AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES (2010).
117.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE TASKFORCE, supra note 46, at 119-27. But see Elizabeth Boros, Pub-

lic and Private Enforcement of Disclosure Breaches in Australia, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 409 (2009)
(commenting on the incremental development of the remedial regime and its overlapping remedies, and arguing in favour of enforcement against individual defendants rather than 'pocket

shifting' compensation against entities).
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ests of the class.1 18 Under the representative action regime, in recent
years, trade associations and others have been refused permission to
represent their members. 119 However, in the recently-enacted sectoral
representative action for follow-on actions in the competition law sector, 2 ° the English Consumers' Association, which was approved as a
representative of consumer claimants. The proposed reforms to the
Financial Services Bill 2010 contemplated permitting representation
12 1
by ideological plaintiffs.
Further debate has related to whether an ideological plaintiff
would need to be one of a list of pre-designated organizations or
whether any organization that met the criteria for adequacy should be
permitted to represent claimants. In the competition law sector regime, only pre-designated organizations were permitted to serve, but
in the proposed Financial Services Bill regime, any suitable entity that
met the statutory requirements for an "appropriate person" would
have been permitted to do so. 122 Finally, there has been debate on
whether ideological claimants should be the sole option for representatives or whether this should be in addition to members of the class.
Again, in the competition law sector regime, only a pre-designated
organization was permitted to serve, but in the proposed Financial
Services Bill regime both could bring claims, provided that they were
"appropriate" persons.
The methods of selecting representatives and their roles also vary
from one regime to another. In the representative action regime, the
representative must have the same interest as those represented. This
has proved to be a difficult threshold to meet. 1 23 Under the Group
Litigation Order, if the court adopts a test case approach,12 4 the claim
of one of the claimants could be considered and the result could have
a precedential effect on the claims of other claimants entered on the
group register. Under the proposed reforms in the Financial Services
Bill 2010, the representative claimant would have to meet the criteria
118. Civil Procedure Rules [CPR] S.I. 1998/3132, Practice Direction 19B, para. 3.1 (U.K.) (an
application for a GLO "may be made either by a claimant or by a defendant").
119. Consorzio del Prosciutto de Parma v. Marks & Spencer Plc [1990] F.S.R. 530 (Ch), affd,
[1991] R.P.C. 351 (A.C.) (U.K.); Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat v.
Cadbury Ltd. [1998] R.P.C. 117 (Ch), affd, [1999] R.P.C. 826 (A.C.) (U.K.).
120. Competition Act, 1998, § 47 (U.K.).
121. See Financial Services Bill, 2010, H.C. Bill 2010-12 (U.K.) (proposing CPR 19.21(3)).
122. Id.
123. Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways Plc. [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch), affd, [2010]
EWCA (Civ) 1284 (A.C.) (U.K.).
124. Civil Procedure Rules [CPR] S.I. 1998/3132, r. 19.13(b) (U.K.).
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of adequacy and satisfy the court of the ability to pay the defendant's
12 5
recoverable costs if ordered to do so.
Netherlands- In deciding whether to approve a settlement
under the WCAM procedure, the Dutch courts will consider carefully
the adequacy of the representation by the representative organization.
The formal standing requirements for such organizations are not onerous, but there is a rigorous judicial assessment of whether an organization is sufficiently representative of the interests of persons on whose
behalf the agreement has been concluded. Whether a representative
organization is generic in nature, such as the Consumers' Association,
the Investors' Association, or an ad hoc foundation established to promote the interests of persons for the benefit of whom a specific settlement agreement has been concluded, 126 it must persuade the court
that it serves the interests of those who it is asking the court to bind
with the settlement it has reached.
In determining the adequacy of the representation, the court may
consider various criteria, such as the activities undertaken by the representative association on behalf of the interests of its members, the
number of interested parties that are members of the association, and
the general acceptance of the association's representation by the interested parties. The court is not empowered to declare the settlement
binding only on a portion of the proposed group, but it may suggest
that the parties modify the petition and limit the binding effect of the
settlement agreement to those who are sufficiently represented. The
reduced coverage may affect the viability of the proposed settlement
as it affects the extent of the closure on questions of liability available
for the responsible party.
Some have questioned the ability of a representative organization
established under Dutch law to represent claimants from outside the
Netherlands. Various practical solutions have emerged, such as written expressions of support for a settlement by representative organizations from other countries whose residents are included in the class
that is sought to be bound, participation by those organizations in negotiating and concluding the settlement agreement, or agreement by
them to become a party to it. In cases involving multi-jurisdictional
classes, the question is not whether any one representative organization represents the class as a whole, but whether the representative
125. See Financial Services Bill, 2010, H.C. Bill 2010-12 (U.K.) (proposing CPR
19.21(2)(b)(iv)).
126. Examples include the Shell Reserves Compensation Foundation in the Shell Settlement
and the Stichting Converium Securities Compensation Foundation in the Converium Settlement.
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associations and foundations are jointly sufficiently capable of representing the interests of the persons for the benefit of whom the settlement has been concluded.
Italy-Any class member or consumer association can serve as
the representative plaintiff. Once an ordinary civil proceeding is declared admissible as a class action, the court issues an order providing
for notice to potential class members and for a deadline to opt in.
Class members who opt in are bound by the outcome but are not considered parties to the suit, which proceeds between the lead plaintiff
and the defendant. The opt-in period can be short and, in any event,
cannot exceed 120 days, after which, no other class actions can be
brought against the same defendant on the same set of issues.
The only reference in the legislation to adequacy of representation relates to the ability of the plaintiff to afford adequate protection
to the interests of the class. While the opt-in requirement enables class
members to avoid participation in a class action in which they are not
confident that their interests will be adequately represented, the lack
of authority to take initiative in the suit prevents class members from
taking steps to ensure that their interests are adequately represented
should they choose to opt-in.
Belgium-Claimant groups must be represented by established
private professional, inter-professional or public associations, or organizations whose statutory aims correspond with the cause of action.
The requirement of representation by these ideological plaintiffs has
been defended1 27 on three grounds: the representative's interests are
aligned with the class as a whole and not with any individual member;' 28 individuals are shielded from the risks and burdens of representation; 129 and financing the litigation is more manageable.
Sweden-There are three kinds of group actions in Sweden: those
led by private persons, those led by organizations, and those led by
public authorities. A private group action may be commenced by a
127. RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 303 (Hart Publishing 2004) [hereinafter MULHERON, Common Law
Class Action].
128. This is the "class-entity" or "class-as-client" theory. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1997-1998); S. Afr. Law
Comm'n, The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law, para. 5.5 (Working Paper No.
57); Vince Morabito, Ideological Plaintiffs and Class Actions-An Australian Perspective, 34
U.B.C. L. REV. 459, 497 (2000-2001); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26-32 (1996).
129. ONT. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 38, at 128, 132; Pierre-Claude Lafond, Consumer Class Actions in Quebec to the Year 2000: New Trends, New Incentives, 8 CONSUMER L. J.
329, 332 (2000).
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natural or legal person who is a member of the group and who has
standing to be a party to the proceedings with respect to at least one
of the causes of action. Non-profit consumer organizations may represent consumers or workers in the area of consumer and environmental law in claims concerning goods, services, or other utilities
offered in the course of business to consumers, primarily for personal
use. Non-profit organizations dedicated to nature conservation and
environmental protection (and professional federations in the fishing,
farming, reindeer husbandry, and forestry industries) can bring actions for injunctions and/or damages for environmental impairment.
Any organization, no matter how small or new, can obtain court approval 130 to serve as a representative of its own members and the public. 131 Finally, the Consumer Ombudsman, the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency, or any other public agency authorized by the government may initiate public group actions. 3 2
A representative plaintiff must be represented by an advocate unless the court authorizes the representative to appear without an advocate or to appear with an advocate who is not a member of the
bar. 1 33 The representative plaintiff's role is to protect the interests of
the members of the group by giving them an opportunity to express
their views on important matters where feasible and by keeping them
informed upon request.134 The right to represent the group does not
cease if there is a change in the circumstances on which the right to
institute the action has been founded. 3 However, if the plaintiff is no
longer considered appropriate to represent the members of the group
in the case, the court appoints someone else who is entitled to do so. If
no new plaintiff can be appointed the group action is dismissed. If the
plaintiff is the appellant's counterparty in a superior court, the court
130. The representative must satisfy the court that it is an appropriate representative in view
of its interest in the matter, its financial capacity to bring a group action, and the circumstances
generally. (SPGA §5.) LAG OM GRUPPRATTEGANG (Svensk fdrfattningssamling [SFS]
2002:599) (Swed.).
131. In the case of organization and public group actions, the representative plaintiff is not a
member of the group. If an organization or public authority has a claim as a member of a group,
the action is treated as a private group action.
132. In The Consumer Ombudsman v. Kraftkommission i Sverige AB Umea [TR] [District
Court] 2004 T5416 (Swed.), the Consumer Ombudsman sought damages on behalf of about
7,000 people for the defendant's failure to supply electricity as agreed under a fixed price contract. The defendant challenged the representation unsuccessfully and about 2,300 people opted
in. A plea for a declaration that the defendant must compensate all group members was heard
and finally approved by the'Court of Appeal in September 2011.
133. SGPA §11.
134. SGPA §17.
135. SGPA §7.
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may appoint someone else who is considered appropriate to conduct
the group's action as plaintiff.136
3. Funding and Financing
Perhaps the most controversial feature of U.S.-style class actions
is the economic context in which it operates. Epithets such as outrageous and obscene are routinely leveled at the quantum of fees
awarded to class counsel upon the successful conclusion of a class action in the United States. All manner of potential abuses are feared
inevitable through adoption of the U.S. approach to funding and financing, and yet in the United States this approach is thought to be
essential to the successful operation of the regime.
Nevertheless, even in legal systems that once regarded conditional fees as fundamentally unacceptable, their merit in the context
of group litigation has prompted reforms to relax the restrictions on
them. And in some legal systems in which there has not been reform
to provide adequate financial incentives, and in which safeguards for
claimants have not been introduced, there is concern that the effectiveness of group litigation may be diminished as a result.
The comparisons below on the topics of funding and financing are
among the most striking in the questions they raise about whether
introducing the changes necessary to meet the basic requirements of a
regime for group litigation inevitably results in "Americanizing" a
civil justice system.
Canada-Most class actions are financed by class counsel, but
some rely on third party financing. In all cases, counsel enters into a
contingency fee arrangement with the representative plaintiff and
agrees to be reimbursed for disbursements and paid for legal services
at a rate of 20-35% of the award or 2-4 times counsel's base fee when
and if the action settles or succeeds at trial. 137 Upon approval by the
court as fair and reasonable, the fee arrangement binds all class members. Some judges give weight to the terms of the contract with the
representative plaintiff, 138 but others do not 139 on the basis that, un136. SGPA §21.
137. Benjamin Alarie, Rethinking the Approval of Class Counsel's Fees in Ontario Class Actions 4 CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 15 (2007) (Can.).

138. See, e.g., Cassano v. Toronto Dominion Bank (2009), 98 O.R. 3d 543, para. 63 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) ("there was nothing in the manner in which the proceeding was conducted that,
in my judgment, would justify a refusal to approve a fee determined in accordance with the
terms on which the retainers were accepted"). See also McLay & Co. v. Cascades Fine Papers
Grp. Inc. (2008), CarswellOnt 7936, para. 6 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) (where Leitch J was
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like the situation in named party litigation, the agreement has not involved a client who is directly affected by the level of fees claimed.140
In Ontario, contingency fees were once prohibited, but the need
for them in class actions prompted a review of this restriction on fee
arrangements-a review that ultimately extended to all matters except
those in family law. It is recognized that class actions rely upon entrepreneurial lawyering with the caveat that "the entrepreneurial lawyer is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself."14' 1 Nevertheless,
counsel fees in Canada do not seem to be as generous as those
awarded in the United States.
The governments of Quebec and Ontario have established funds
to which class counsel may apply for financial support. Applications
are accepted on the basis of a number of factors including the likelihood of success and the public interest in the case. In return for a
percentage of the award' 4 2 both funds cover disbursements and provide indemnification against adverse costs awards 143 and the Qu6bec
fund may also provide for legal fees. In a legal system in which an
unsuccessful plaintiff may be required to pay the costs of the defendant, the indemnity is an important safeguard for representative plaintiffs, and for their counsel who may otherwise be called upon to
provide it.
Apart from this, the Ontario Class Proceedings Fund has not
been regarded as entirely successful. On the one hand, there is concern that its limited resources could easily be depleted by a large unsuccessful matter; and on the other hand, established plaintiff's
counsel prefer to finance the litigation themselves if they are confi"prepared to approve this fee request because it is consistent with the retainer agreement entered into with the representative plaintiff"); see Jasminka Kalajdzic, supra note 69, at 11.
139. Martin v. Barrett [2008] O.J. No. 2105, para. 48 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).
140. Id. at para. 52.
141. Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada, supra note 79, at para. 66.
142. In Ontario, the percentage recovery is 10 percent on top of the amount of funding previously paid by the Ontario Fund to the representative plaintiff. Class Proceedings, 0. Reg. 771/92,
s. 10(3)(b) (Can. Ont.). In Qu6bec, the amount collected by its Fund varies depending on the
method of recovery by the class, and applies in every class action, not just those in which funding
has been granted. See Regulation Respecting the Percentage Withheld by the Fonds d'aide aux
recours collectifs, R.R.Q. c. R-21, r. 3.1 (Can. Que.).
143. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, amended by Law Society Amendment Act (Class
Proceedings Funding), S.O. 1992, c. 7, s. 3 (Can.). In Qu6bec, if a cost award is made against the
representative plaintiff and he or she is unable to pay, the defendant may then apply to the
Qu6bec Fund for payment. See An Act Respecting the Class Action, R.S.Q. 2000, c. R-21, s. 20
(Can. Que.). The Fund then becomes subrogated to the defendant's rights as against the unsuccessful representative: See id. at s. 31. Adverse costs awards are not inevitable in Ontario, but
they are not available at all in some other provinces, and this distinction has resulted in some
debate about whether they can inappropriately discourage claims from being brought.
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dent of success, rather than invest the time in making an application to
the Fund knowing that it will claim 10% of a successful recovery.
Finally, third party financing arrangements are now being approved. Under these arrangements, financiers indemnify plaintiffs in
return for a levy on settlement or judgment proceeds of less than
10%.' 4 If such arrangements become commonplace, there may be
need for greater regulatory or judicial oversight.14 5
Australia-Since the Australian High Court approval of litigation financier underwriting and control of class proceedings,14 6 conditional fee agreements have frequently been combined with litigation
financing. Conditional fee or "no win no fee" agreements address
some of the concerns of cost shifting 14 7 by permitting lawyers to
charge uplift fees of tewnty-five to fifty percent on their prescribed
fees, which are payable only in the event of success, but otherwise
they leave the claim holder liable for disbursements and adverse costs.
Litigation funding, however, costs an average of thirty percent of the
proceeds 14 8 but it provides indemnity for adverse costs awards and it
covers all or a part of the legal costs and disbursements. 4 9
The courts have recognized the public importance of taking the
financial risk of pursuing class actions by requiring class members to
enter into a litigation funding agreement, thereby closing the class to
free riders.'5 0 This has made the indemnities in such agreements significant in attracting members. Furthermore, third-party funding has
been important in Australia, where all the States prohibit contingency
fee arrangements and the challenges of financing the action through
to its conclusion have proved onerous. 5 '
144. See Metzler Investment GMBH v. Gildan Activewear Inc. [2009] O.J. No. 33150 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL); MacQueen v. Sydney Steel Corp.,2011 NSSC 484 (Can. N.S.); Dugal v.
Manulife Corp. (2011), 105 O.R. 3d 364 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
145. Sandra Rubin, Enter the Silent Partner LEXPERT MAG. July/Aug. 2011, at 56-61; Luis
Millan, Why class actions create ethical minefields, LAW. WKLY (Aug. 19, 2011), at 4, 7.
146. Campbells Cash & Carry Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.).
147. Vince Morabito, Contingency Fee Agreements with Represented Persons in ClassActions
- An Undesirable Australian Phenomenon, 34 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 201 (2005).
148. VINCE MORABITO, An Empirical Study of Australia's Class Action Regimes, Second
Report: Litigation Funders, Competing Class Actions, Opt Out Rates, Victorian Class Actions
and Class Representatives 38-39 (2010).
149. Id.
150. Multiplex Funds Mgmt. Ltd. v P Dawson Nominees Pty. Ltd. (2007) 164 FCR 275 at
paras 141-142 (Austl.).
151. GREG HOUSTON, SVETLANA STARYKH, ASTRID DAHL & SHANE ANDERSON, NERA
ECON. CONSULTING, TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION: 1 JANUARY 1993 - 31
DECEMBER 2009, at 2 (May 9, 2010).
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The acceptance of third-party funding of class actions was fore-

shadowed by litigation financing in insolvency and in other commercial applications. 152 It has been part of broader economic changes to
the legal profession, 153 which have included the de-regulation of legal
services, the introduction of multi-disciplinary practice, permitting
non-lawyers to own interests in law firms,' 54 and the listing of law
firms on the Australian Securities Exchange. 5 5 Access to capital markets to underwrite the expansion of legal practice and access to capital
markets to underwrite litigation have prompted increased corporate
regulation, new causes of action, broader shareholder ownership, and
of entitlement to monetary compensation for inan enhanced sense
156
vestment losses.
However, these developments, particularly in securities class actions, 57 have caused concern that lawyers are opportunistically stirring up claims for financial gain and little social benefit.' 58 Conflicts of
interest between financiers, law firms, and claim holders have exacerbated the concern.'

9

Nevertheless, the government and ASIC have

not been persuaded to require litigation financiers to register their underwriting of class actions as managed investment schemes' 60 or to

& FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN
UK & US (2008).
153. On the nature of this transformation see more generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END
OF LAWYERS RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2010).
154. Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovations in Regulation - Responding to a Changing
Legal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 527-28 (2009).
155. Id. at 515.
156. Michael Legg, Shareholder Class Actions in Australia - The Perfect Storm, 31
U.N.S.W.L.J. 669, 671- 674 (2008) (Austl.); Peta Spender, After Fostif Lingering uncertainties
and controversies about litigation funding, 18 J. JUD. ADMIN. 101, 102 (2008) (Austl.).
157. E.g., Kathy Merrick, The Multiplex class action settlement - best andfairest outcome or is
there room for improvement?, 62 KEEPING GOOD Cos., Oct. 2010, at 542; Hon. PA Keane, Access to Justice and other Shibboleths, Judicial Conference of Australian Colloquim in Melbourne
(Oct. 10, 2009), available at http://www.jca.asn.au/attachments/2009AccesstoJustice.pdf; Spender,
152. See

VICK WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY

AUSTRALIA,

supra note 156.

158. See, e.g., Campbells Cash & Carry Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 487
(Austl.) (Callinan & Heydon, JJ., dissenting).
159. LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., POSITION PAPER, REGULATION OF LITIGATION FUNDING IN
AUSTRALIA (June 2011).
160. Brookfield Multiplex Ltd. v Int'l Litig. Funding Partners Pte Ltd. (No. 3) (2009) 256
ALR 427 (Austl.) (a full federal court decision determining that litigation funding of class actions was a managed investment scheme subject to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 5C (Austl.)).
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new regulations
hold an Australian Financial Services License,'161 1but
62
are being drafted to address conflicts of interest.
England and Wales-Like Canada and Australia, civil litigation
in England and Wales operates on the principle of cost-shifting. Accordingly, a representative claimant must be able to finance the litigation and pay adverse costs in the event that the claim does not
succeed. Conditional fee arrangements are permitted and counsel may
recover up to twice its regular rate of fees in the event of success, but
percentage recoveries are not yet permitted.
Third party funders may finance the litigation and provide indemnity against adverse costs awards. A Working Group is presently
drafting a voluntary Code of Conduct for such arrangements. Afterthe-event insurers may provide coverage for adverse costs, and
before-the-event insurers, presumably through coverage held by the
claimants, may join together to finance the litigation. The class members may contribute to a common fund for the costs of litigation and
the potential costs of an adverse costs award. 6 3 The Legal Services
Commission may provide financing through legal aid for the costs of
litigation and to indemnify a claimant against adverse costs awards.
Such funding has not generally been provided for consumer claims.
Other funding mechanisms that have been considered include a Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme, or an Access to Justice Fund set up
1 64
under statute.
The rules governing costs and funding in litigation in England and
Wales, including group litigation, are under review pursuant to the
Jackson Costs Enquiry, 65 and presently, a proposal for 'damagesbased agreements' (which largely replicate a true contingency fee),
contained in Part II of the Legal Aid, Sentencing, and Punishment of
Offenders Bill, is undergoing Parliamentary debate. The Civil Justice
161. But see Int'l Litig. Partners Pte. Ltd. v Chameleon Mining NL (2011) 276 ALR 138
(Austl.) (determining that litigation funding was a financial product and that litigation financiers
therefore required Australian Financial Services Licenses under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) c 7
(Austl.)).
162. Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2010 (Cth.) CO 10/333 (currently
effective until 30 June 2011); see also Hon. Chris Bowen, Address to Shareholder Class Action
Conference (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.chrisbowen.net/media-centre/allNews.do
?newlD=3132.
163. This was used in the Equitable Life Group Litigation and Railtrack Private Shareholders

Action Group Litigation.

See EQUITABLE

LIFE MEMBERS

SUPPORT

GROUP,

http://

www.equitablelifemembers.org.uk/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); Weir v. Sec'y of State for Transp.
(No. 1) [2005] EWHC (Ch) 812 (U.K.) (brought by RPSAG).
164. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 194 (Eng.).
165. See SIR RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 330-36
(2009).
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Council had earlier recommended that contingency fees should be
permitted where no other form of funding is available to enhance access to justice. 16 6 Currently, claimants seek to address the risks of adverse costs awards through costs-capping orders 16' and the Civil
Justice Council has recommended a presumption in favour of such or168
ders in group litigation.
Netherlands-Group litigation is financed and funded in the
same way as ordinary litigation. There are no conditional or contingency fee arrangements, but generic representative organizations,
which still depend upon the contributions of members, are considered
professional funders. Ad hoc representative groups employ some
forms of contingency arrangements with interested parties and there is
public discussion of introducing some form of contingency fees, but
there is concern that this could lead to high costs and litigation that is
excessively lawyer-focused.
There is no public funding of representative organizations, 169 but
there is legal aid and legal insurance, which has been sought in mass
claims, and there is public discussion about whether a policy of public
financial support would improve access to justice. Nevertheless, the
need for funding and financing of the WCAM procedure needs to be
understood in context. The need for financial resources is eased by the
fact that the principle costs of negotiating, realizing, and executing a
settlement agreement are borne by the representative organizations
and the responsible parties. The settlement, once reached, usually provides for recovery of the costs of the representative organizations, including the costs of adequate worldwide representation for ad hoc
representatives. The relatively inexpensive nature of the WCAM procedure is an important feature of its success.
Italy-There are no special funding or financing rules for class
actions. As in ordinary proceedings, each party must bear its own expenses during the proceeding and, pursuant to the loser-pays rule, the
prevailing party is generally entitled to recover its costs when the matter is over. In the handful of class actions commenced to date, con166. CJC, IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FUNDING OPTIONS AND PROPORTIONATE COSTS:
THE FUTURE FUNDING OF LITIGATION: ALTERNATIVE FUNDING STRUCTURES 68 (2007).
167. See A B v. Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2003] EWHC (0B) 1034 (Eng.).
168. CJC, IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FUNDING OPTIONS AND PROPORTIONATE COSTS
26, recommendation 7 (2005).
169. Such as the Dutch Consumers Organisation (Consumentenbond) established by the Injunctions Directive 98/27/EC. Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166)
51-53.
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sumer organizations were probably motivated to represent individual
claimants more by a desire to raise their profile than by a hope for
financial benefit from bringing a successful action.
Contingency fee agreements are forbidden, but attorneys may
enter into an agreement to receive a success fee calculated according
to a mandatory rate, approved by the government if they win the case.
This is unlikely to make such actions profitable, particularly as damages awards are strictly compensatory. Moreover, in making an award
in favour of the plaintiff, a court may choose merely to set the criteria
for determining damages for class members, who would then need to
commence separate actions to recover damages on the basis of the
criteria. Finally, there is no statutory regime for third-party funding,
either to permit it or to regulate it, placing this in an area of legal
uncertainty.
Belgium-Under the existing procedures, the litigation is funded
and financed by the claimants, or, in the case of group actions, by the
organizations that are permitted to seek the injunctive or preventative
relief. Apart from agreement on the possibility of funding through a
government fund, the three proposals for class actions lack a clear vision on this aspect of group litigation.
Despite the range of apparent options-funding by the class,
funding by the class representative, funding by the class attorney, and
funding by a third party-only funding by the government seems
likely to provide a way forward. Funding by the plaintiff is feasible
only for ideological plaintiffs and even then, the risk of adverse costs
awards seems likely to create considerable disincentive."' Funding by
the class attorney is not an option because contingency fees are prohibited as a violation of public order and as incompatible with professional ethical obligations. 17 1 It is conceivable that fees partially
dependent on the outcome of the case might be permitted, but this
could be seen as creating a personal financial stake in the litigation,
which would impair counsel's ability to fulfil the role of securing the
due administration of justice as part of counsel's professional
responsibility.
Only outside funding seems likely to meet with success. Whether
this funding takes the form of legal expenses insurance (before-the170.

Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 1, at 199; AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, GROUPED

No. 46, para. 252 (1988).
171. See Code Judiciare [C.Jud.] art. 446 (Belg.); see generally Vincent Sagaert & Ilse Samoy,

PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURT, REPORT

Belgian Report, in THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION. A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-

217, 217 (Christopher Hodges, Stefen Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibaca eds., Hart Publishing 2010).
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event insurance),' 72 legal aid funding, a government fund,' 7 3 or third

party funding,1 74 it is much more likely to succeed with an ideological
plaintiff as class representative, because such a representative will be

more likely enjoy the respect and confidence of funders in its discharge of the responsibilities of representation.
Sweden- In Sweden, the costs of litigation are borne by the losing party except in small claims cases where parties represent themselves or pay their own lawyers. In group litigation, representative
plaintiffs and any group members who intervene in the proceedings
are liable for adverse costs awards. However, conditional fee arrangements called risk agreements, are commonplace, with attorneys receiv-

ing double or triple the normal rate if the action is successful and half
the rate or nothing if the action fails.
These agreements are not binding on defendants, who cannot be
ordered to pay more than the customary hourly rate. Any plaintiff's

counsel fees that a defendant cannot pay are borne by the members of
the plaintiff class from the proceeds of the award. Risk agreements

are binding only if approved by the court as reasonable in view of the
nature of the case. 175 Thus, among the criteria for determining the
adequacy of representative plaintiffs is the financial capacity to prosecute the action, including investigations and counsel,' 7 6 but not neces-

sarily an adverse costs award if unsuccessful.
The assessment of financial capacity was intended to be limited to

determining that the plaintiff's financial affairs were in order, in that
he or she had a reasonable annual income and access to public legal
aid' 7 7 or private legal insurance (although both are usually limited to
172. In this context, see the Eschig decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in
which the Court ruled that article 4(1)(a) of Council Directive 87/344 on the coordination of
laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance must be interpreted as not permitting the legal expenses insurer to reserve the right, where a large number
of insured persons suffer loss as a result of the same event, itself to select the legal representative
of all the insured persons concerned. See Case C-199/08, Erhard Eschig v. UNIQA Sachversicherung AG, 2009 E.C.R. 1-08295.
173. The best example can be found in Qu6bec with the Fonds d'aide aux recours collectifs,
GOV'T QUEBEC, www.farc.justice.gouv.qc.ca/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Also Ontario has a
Class ProceedingsFund, L. FOUNO. ONTARIO, www.lawfoundation.on.ca/cpcabout.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
174. See Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third Party Funding: A Changing Landscape,
27 C.J.Q. 312 (2008).
175. SGPA §38 (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.).
176. Note however that, unlike in the United States, the court both issues and pays for notice
to group members in group actions under the Swedish Act. See 50 § SGPA (Swed.).
177. Public legal aid is available only to plaintiffs who do not have and should not be expected to have private legal insurance (due to poverty or comparable circumstances).
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an amount equal to customary attorney's fees for less than 100 hours
of work or C10,000). Nevertheless, the risk of adverse costs awards is
a strong deterrent to pursuing an action and there are no government
funds to which a representative plaintiff may apply for indemnity.
Accordingly, it was anticipated that of the expected ten or so
group actions per year most would be commenced by organizations
and not by individuals. In fact, in the first six years of operation the
group action regime saw only twelve group actions commenced in total, and despite very liberal standing rules for representative organizations, none have been commenced in this way. Only one public group
action has been brought, that by the Consumer Ombudsman, and the
other eleven have been private group actions, albeit with many enjoying the support of non-profit organizations. Such organizations are
not eligible for public legal aid or private legal insurance, but they
may raise funds from their members and shield them from personal
responsibility for adverse costs. Alternatively, a number of the members of the class may agree to be named so as to share the financial
risk involved and, possibly, to benefit from multiple legal insurance
policies, where this is not excluded by the policies.
In "true" organization actions, the organization cannot also be a
group member (i.e., have an interest of its own); if the organization is
a group member, the lawsuit is treated as a private group action. However, legal persons, such as non-profit organizations, may initiate private group actions. A group of people who want to initiate a group
action may form an organization or foundation solely for the purpose.
By transferring one of the members' claims for damages, or only part
of it, to the legal person (the organization) becomes a member of the
group. By this means, the organization gains standing to initiate a private group action (but not an organization action) on behalf of everyone who opts in, whether or not they are members of the
organization. While the organization's finances must be "inorder"' 7 8
for the organization to be accepted as a plaintiff, this can be arranged
by collecting dues or other funding from the association's members
(such as a limited guaranty). By this means, the members can limit
their financial risk. In addition, members are shielded from the risk of
being required to pay the opponent's costs because the named plaintiff - the organization - bears the entire risk. This "transfer method"
is also open to existing organizations, foundations, and other legal
persons not formed solely for the purpose of litigating a claim.
178. SGPA §8 para 5.
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4. Available Relief
Ultimately, for the members of the class, the nature of the relief
available for individual claimants is the most significant feature of the
regime. Are they able to receive individual compensation? Must they
commence separate proceedings to do so? If so, in what forum must
this be done? Does the relief granted preclude them from making
other claims? For members of the public whose claims are subject to
collective redress, these considerations can be determinative of the effectiveness of the regime.
Canada-Most class proceedings in Canada, like most ordinary
proceedings, seek compensatory damages for pecuniary losses. Declarations and injunctions are available, but they are often more efficiently and cost-effectively resolved through test cases or ordinary
litigation. 17 9 Accordingly, for example, class actions against the government seeking declaratory relief and damages for breaches of ab18 0
original rights have been difficult to certify.
For cases that go to trial, the legislation provides for the determination of damages. In particular, the legislation provides for the assessment of aggregate awards and the use of sampling evidence in
appropriate circumstances and for making awards to members of the
class on an average or proportional basis.18 ' The legislation further
provides for the participation of individual members of the class for
determination of issues particular to them 18 2 and for the distribution
of judgments, including by a cy pros method.'8 3 To date, less than
twenty class actions have gone to trial, but the courts have found these
provisions useful in determining whether to certify claims as class
actions. 8 4

179. Roach v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2009] O.J. No. 737 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) (denying certification motion in action seeking declaration of constitutional invalidity).
180. See, e.g., Davis v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2007 NLTD 25.
181. See, e.g., Class Proceedings Act [CPA], S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss. 23-24 (Can. Ont.).
182. Id. at s. 25.
183. Id. at s. 26.
184. See, e.g., Cassano v. TD Bank, 2007 ONCA 781, [2007] 87 O.R. 3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.)
(relying on section 24 of the CPA to find that establishing the extent of the bank's liability did
not require making individual inquiries of cardholders; rather, the aggregate of the bank's liability could be determined by looking at its records of the amount of fee income collected over the
class period); Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank, 2007 ONCA 334 para. 45, [2007] 85 O.R. 3d 321,
para. 45 (Can. Ont. C.A.) ("statistical sampling can be employed to determine the aggregate or
part of the defendant's liability without proof of individual claims.").
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In recent years, a number of class action settlements have provided for cy pros distribution of all or part of the award 1 85 because the
cost of locating and compensating class members would exceed the
amounts to be distributed. Critics have noted the lack of connection
between the class and the cy pros recipient in some cases,' 86 and the
fact that the cost of locating and compensating class members, though
significant, has not always exceeded the funds available under the
award. 18 7 Some have argued that, where a cy pros distribution is justified, the proceeds should be directed to charities or non-profit organizations whose works will indirectly benefit188 the class in order to
promote the objectives of class proceedings.
Australia-In deciding class actions, judges may: determine issues of law and fact; make declarations of liability; grant equitable
relief; make awards of damages for class members, sub-class members,
or individual class members, consisting of specified amounts or
amounts worked out as the court specifies; award damages in an ag-

class memgregate amount without specifying amounts for individual
1 89
bers; and make such other orders as they think just.
Damages in the aggregate may be awarded without specifying
amounts for individual class members only where it is possible to
make a reasonably accurate assessment of the total. 190 For example, in
a class action in respect of a pyramid scheme, the ACCC sought an
injunction and a declaration that the members were entitled to re185. In Professor Kalaidzic's 2010 study of cy pros awards, she estimated that 35 class actions
involving fixed cy pros awards had settled in the previous ten years. Jasminka Kalajdzic, Consumer (In)Justice: Reflections on Canadian Consumer Class Actions, 50 CAN. Bus. L.J. 356, 371
n.58 (2011).
186. Jeff Berryman, Class Actions and the Exercise of Cy pros Doctrine: Time for Improved
Scrutiny, in THE LAW OF REMEDIES: NEw DIREcTiONS IN THE COMMON LAw ch. 22 (J. Ber-

ryman & R. Bigwood eds., Irwin Law 2009); Jeff Berryman, Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink:
Behavioural Modification, Cy pres Distributionsand Class Actions, 53 SUPREME COURT L. REV.
2d 133 (2011) [Hereinafter Nudge, Nudge]; Jasminka Kalajdzic, Access to a Just Result: Revisiting
Settlement Standards and Cy pres Distributions,6 CAN. CLASS ACrION REV. 217, 246-247 (2010)

[hereinafter Kalajdzic, Access to a Just Result].
187. The OLRC adopted the same approach, stating that "all feasible efforts" must be made
to compensate class members directly before making any cy pros distribution. ONT. LAW REPORT COMM'N, supra note 38, at 581.

188. Class Proceedings Act, supra note 4, at c. 26(4) (Can. Ont.) (courts can direct the payment of aggregate amounts in any manner that "may reasonably be expected to benefit the class
members"); Kalajdzic, Access to a Just Result, supra note 185; Berryman, Nudge, Nudge, supra
note 186.
189. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33Z(1); Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33Z(1) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 177(1) (Austl.).
190. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33Z(3); Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33Z(3) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 177(3) (Austl.).
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in the amount of

$50 per class member for a total award of $600,000. This was permitted because the respondents possessed the information to refute the
claim if they wanted a substantially different result.192

In making orders for damages awards, the court makes provision
for the distribution to the class,1 93 including the manner for members

to establish their entitlement to a share of the damages and the manner in which disputes over entitlement may be determined; 194 and for

the constitution and administration of a fund, either through the payment of a fixed sum or instalments, and the terms of the fund, such as
195
the entitlement to interest.

Unlike Canada's legislative class action regimes, Australian

courts are not permitted to make cy pros orders,19 6 because it has
been thought that any money ordered to be paid by the respondent

should be matched with an entitlement to compensation. Anything
more would be in the nature of a penalty and this would go beyond

the mandate for procedural reform underlying the class actions regime. 197 Where the cost of identifying class members and distributing
the damages would be excessive, the court may order the termination
of the proceeding. 98
The Victorian Law Reform Commission had recommended per-

mitting cy pros remedies in cases involving a proven contravention of
the law creating a pecuniary advantage for the wrongdoer, where the
loss suffered was quantifiable and it was not cost effective to identify
and compensate some or all of the class members.1 99 This recommen-

dation was not implemented but it was endorsed by the New South
Wales Government in its plans to introduce a legislative class action
191. Austl. Comp. & Consumer Comm'n v Golden Sphere Int'l [1998] 83 FCR 424, 424
(Austl.).
192. See id. at 446-47.
193. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33Z(2); Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33Z(2) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 177(2) (Austl.).
194. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33Z(4); Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33Z(4) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 177(4) (Austl.).
195. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33ZA(1); Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33ZA(1) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 178(1) (Austl.).
196. See RACHAEL MULHERON, THE MODERN CY PRtS DOCTRINE: APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (University College London Press 2006).
197. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 46, at 239.
198. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33M; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)
pt 4A s 33M (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 165 (Austl.).
199. VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, Civil Justice Review, Report No. 14, at 559-560,
recommendation 101 (2008), available at http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/
VLRC%2BCivil%2BJustice%2BReview%2B-%2BReport.pdf.
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regime. 2 00 However, criticism by law firms, business groups and the
Law Society caused this to be dropped from the Bill. As a result, for
example in the vitamin price-fixing cases, class membership was limited to those who had purchased far larger quantities than the average
consumers.

20 1

Englandand Wales-The opt-in nature of group litigation in England, together with the absence of provision for aggregate assessment
of damages have limited the relief available under Group Litigation
Orders and the follow-on competition law regime under the Competition Act of 1998. Restitutionary damages and an accounting for profits
are not available in competition infringement cases, and punitive damages cannot be claimed where the defendant has already been fined by
a competition regulator.2 °2 Accordingly, in the only action to date
under the Competition Act 20 3 recovery was limited to compensation

for purchasers of the price-fixed football shirts who came forward during the take-up period.
The relief available under the English representative action has
always proved difficult, since the decision a century ago2" 4 in which a
representative action was not permitted on behalf of consignors of
cargo lost at sea because proof of damage was personal to each consignor, and there was no possibility of any common fund being sought
by the representative on behalf of the represented parties. A century
later, the represented claimants in recent price fixing litigation20 '
200. Hon. John Hatzistergos, NSW Set to Reform Class Action Laws, NSW Gov'T,
RELEASE

MEDIA

(Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/LawlinklCorporate/llcorporate.nsf/

vwFiles/060810-NSW-reform-c-action-laws.pdf/$file/060810-NSW-reform c-action-laws.pdf
("[T]he NSW legislation will give the Supreme Court the power to order that unclaimed damages from a successful class action be distributed to a charity or public interest beneficiary");

Explanatory Memorandum, Civil Procedure Amendment (Supreme Court Representative Proceedings) Bill 2010 (NSW)

3 (Austl.), available at http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/exposure/

archive/b2010-108-d05.pdf ("Section 178 [...

1enables the court to make orders

[... ] establishing

schemes for any money remaining in the fund [consisting of money to be distributed to group

members] (or any part of it), that cannot practically be distributed to group members to be
applied cy pr~s").
201. Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. [2003] FCA 1505 9 (Austl.) ($2,000); Jarra Creek
Cent. Packing Shed Pty. Ltd. v Amcor Ltd. [2006] FCA 1802 (Austl.) ($100,000); Auskay Int'l

Mfg. & Trade Pty. Ltd. v Qantas Airways Ltd. [2010] FCA 1302 (Austl.) (a cartel in international
air freight services $20,000); Wright Rubber Prod. v Bayer AG [2011] FCA 1172 (Austl.) (a
cartel in the rubber chemicals industry $50,000 for rubber chemicals and $10,000 for rubber
compounds).

202. Devenish Nutrition Ltd. v. Sanofi-Aventis SA (Fr.) [2007] EWHC (Ch) 2394 (Eng.),
affd, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1086 (Eng.).
203. Consumers Ass'n v. JJB Sports Plc., [2009] CAT 2, 2009 WL 364157 (Eng. & Wales).
204. Markt & Co., Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co., Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 1021 (A.C.) (Eng.).
205. Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1284.
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sought a declaration that damages were recoverable in principle in
respect of three types of loss that they claimed to have suffered subject to individual assessment. This claim this was not accepted as having the requisite same interest for a representative proceeding.
While cy pr~s damages distributions are not formally recognized
in England, one price-fixing action in the automobile industry that settled before group litigation orders were available, involved a payment
to the Consumers' Association for car safety research; and one representative action for pirated cassettes2 0 6 resulted in payment to the
British Phonographic Industry Ltd, to support the identification and
suppression of counterfeit and piracy activities. The proposed Financial Services Bill 2010 reforms contemplated provision for cy pr~s
damages distributions. 0 7
Netherlands-Underthe WCAM procedure, financial relief may
be claimed by interested parties pursuant to an order prescribing the
damages based on various categories of loss. In turn, interested parties
who have not opted out are precluded from commencing separate
claims for loss.
By contrast, under the collective right of action under the Dutch
Civil Code almost every form of relief may be claimed other than
monetary relief. Typically, claimants seek declaratory relief establishing liability and injunctive relief requiring the responsible party to
perform or refrain from performing an act with respect to the parties.
Interested parties must then commence individual actions to prove
causation and loss in order to receive damages.
In this way, the two procedures support one another with the collective right of action being used to solve unanswered questions of law
without financial risk to either the claimants or the responsible party,
thereby facilitating negotiation of a settlement agreement. The absence of direct monetary consequences to the collective right of action
may reduce the risk of "black mail settlements" and the absence of
formal determinations of liability in the WCAM may permit responsible persons to obtain closure on claims without damage to their reputations. Nevertheless, the main Dutch consumer organization, the
Consumentenbond, argues that there is no real incentive to settle
without a collective proceeding that has financial consequences and
when there is no interest in settling there is no way for interested parties to obtain financial compensation in individually, economically
non-viable claims.
206. EMI Records Ltd. v. Riley, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 923 (Ch) (Eng.).
207. Financial Services Bill, supra note 15, § 23(4)-(5) (U.K.).
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Italy-There now exists a public class action in addition to the
collective actions created in the fields of consumer law, environmental
protection, securities regulation, and anti-discrimination protection
that were developed pursuant to EU Directives. 0 8 Public class actions
may brought by qualified bodies or entities in the administrative
courts and they may seek injunctive relief from the inertia of public
administration. Damages are not available, but the courts may mandate the administration (as defendant) to fulfil its obligations. Interested persons may then seek damages in the civil courts in individual
actions or private class actions under the Consumer Code.
Belgium-Currently, group litigation in Belgium can be used
only to obtain injunctive or preventive relief, such as injunctions
20 9 or illegal canvassing practices, 2 10
preventing environmental harm
not compensation for those affected. 2 1' Each of the three current proposals for reform permits claims for monetary relief. The government's proposal also permits class settlements or court decisions to
provide for amounts below a certain threshold not to be distributed if
the costs are prohibitive and, instead, to be deposited into a government fund to finance future class actions. The Flemish Bar Council
proposal would permit the judge to appoint a special master 2 12 to deal
with the individual claims of class members out of court.
SWEDEN-The

Swedish Act on Group Proceedings covers group

actions in general courts and its use is not restricted to any particular
area of law. In all three forms of group actions under the Act, the
plaintiff can petition for injunctions and seek individual damages for
208. See Council Directive 98/27/EC O.J. (L 166) 51 (EU); Council Directive 2009/22/EC
O.J. (L 110) 30 (EU).

209. Wet van betreffende een vorderingsrecht inzake bescherming van het leefmilieu [Federal Environmental Protection Act] of Jan. 12, 1993, [Belgisch Staatsblat] [B.S.] Feb. 19, 1993
(Belg.).
210. Wet op de financiele transacties en de financidle markten, [Act on Financial Transactions and Financial Markets] of Dec. 4, 1990, [Belgisch Staatsblat] [B.S.] Dec. 22, 1990 (Belg.).
211. Proposals to follow the 1994 Dutch initiative of combining these proceedings in a single
transubstantive procedure (article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code) have not yet succeeded. Mathias E. Storme & Evelyne Terryn, BELGIAN REPORT ON CLASS ACrION 2 (2007), available at

http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sitesdefault/files/documents/Belgium-National-Report.
pdf. The most recent Belgian proposal, dating from February 2008, suggests supplementing article 18 of the Judicial Code with "the plaintiff is supposed to have an interest in commencing a
group action, when he is an association (organization) that has legal capacity for a minimum
period of one year, when he acts in accordance with his permissible statutory aim and when he
shows a real activity in accordance with his statutory aim."
212. Called "a judicial claim settler." See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in
Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989); Wayne D. Brazil,
Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986).
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injury suffered by individual members of the group. Actions for an
order obliging the defendant to perform (e.g. pay damages or stop a
certain activity) and/or petitions for declaratory judgments (see footnote 6 supra) may be entertained as a group action. However, customary substantive rules on causation in tort law, calculation of damages,
and evidence are applied. Post-trial calculation mechanisms, standardized computation of damages and cy pros solutions are not available
under the Swedish Act. Punitive damages do not exist in Sweden. This
restrictive attitude reduces access to justice in group actions as well as
in other forms of litigation.
5. Court Involvement
The management of class actions creates new challenges for common law and civil law courts alike. On the one hand, common law
courts must develop ways to address the adversarial void in which the
interests of class counsel and defense counsel in gaining approval for
settlements are aligned so that the court is deprived of the fundamental forensic benefits of the adversary system. On the other hand, in
civil law jurisdictions, given the quantum of money at stake in an aggregated claim, the parties may insist on greater involvement in the
process than might ordinarily be expected. The particular responsibilities assigned to the court reflect important assessments of judicial
competence and the requirements for oversight of group litigation.
Canada-Underclass proceedings legislation: matters must be
certified in order to proceed as class actions; notices to the class must
be approved by the court; each action is case managed by the judge
assigned to it; and matters may be settled and counsel fees determined
only with the approval of the court. This extensive court involvement
is intended to ensure that the interests of absent class members are
protected.
The supervisory role of judges is especially important in hearings
held to determine the fairness of a settlement because the usual adversarial safeguards do not operate when plaintiff's counsel and defendants have a common interest in obtaining approval for the settlement
that they have negotiated.213 Until recently, Canadian courts did not
welcome the involvement of non-parties in ensuring that the settlement is "fair, reasonable[,] and in the best interests of the class."
While their U.S. counterparts have long been encouraged to permit
213. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart, 2010 ONSC 1334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) ("It is also well
known that the court finds itself in a difficult position in carrying out its responsibilities of determining whether a settlement and class counsel's fee should be approved or rejected").
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non-profit entities, government bodies, and state attorneys-general to
participate actively in fairness hearings to provide assistance to the
court, 14 Canadian courts have only recently acknowledged in principle the value of a court-appointed monitors, amici curiae or guardians

ad litem in assisting the judge in scrutinizing the proposed settlement
or counsel fee. 21 5
Australia-It is well understood in Australia that grouped pro-

ceedings require greater judicial oversight than regular proceedings to
protect the interests of unidentified parties, to administer arrangements for notice and the distribution of relief, and to determine subgroup issues and individual questions.2 16 Accordingly, judges have
been granted broad powers to manage class proceedings2 17 including:

for the approval of notices to the class;21 8 for creating sub-classes
where necessary and appointing representatives for them;219 for approving proposed settlements;2 2 0 and for discontinuing the proceedings.221 Settlement approval has been acknowledged to be particularly
difficult because the application is based on a result negotiated be-

tween plaintiff's counsel and the defendant and it is not usually opposed.2 2 Judges have rarely declined to approve the settlement

agreements 223 despite criticism by some commentators, 224 but there
do not appear to have been any instances of "coupon settlements" or
other potentially abusive results. 225 Nevertheless, with so many class
214.

& THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGA(2009).
215. Smith v. Nat'l Money Mart, 2011 ONCA 233 (Can. Ont. CA). Since this decision was
released, an amicus or guardian has not been appointed in any reported class action. It is difficult
to predict how frequently such court-appointed assistance will be used.
216. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 46, at 1 157.
217. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33ZF; Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33ZF (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 183 (Austl.).
218. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33Y; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)
pt 4A s 33Y (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 176 (Austl.).
219. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33Q; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)
pt 4A s 33Q (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 168 (Austl.).
220. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33W; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)
pt 4A s 33W (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 174 (Austl.).
221. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33V; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)
pt 4A s 33V (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 173 (Austl.).
222. Lopez v Star World Enters. Pty. Ltd. 11999] FCA 104 para 15-16 (Austl.).
223. See generally Vince Morabito, An Australian Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 69
MOD. L. REV. 347, 367-371 (2006).
224. See, e.g., Marsha Jacobs, Telstra Class Action Settled for Just $5m, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
Nov. 17, 2007, at 3; Vince Morabito, Judicial Responses to Class Action Settlements that Provide
no Benefits to some Class Members, 32 MONASH U. L. REV. 75 (2006).
225. In the United States, several class action settlements provided class members with coupons for discounts on future purchases from the defendants, in lieu of cash awards, whilst generBARBARA

J.

ROTHSTEIN

TION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 15
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actions ending in settlement, this will continue to be a matter of
concern.
Unlike North American class action regimes, the Australian regimes do not provide for certification, but for a respondent's right to
challenge the validity of a class proceeding at any time226 where the
requirements for class proceedings have not been satisfied2 27 or where
the court is of the view that it is inappropriate that the proceeding
progress as a class proceeding.22 8 While this approach was meant to
streamline the progress of class actions, the routine practice of challenging the validity of the class proceeding has produced much the
same result as exists in North America 229 and it has prompted commentators to recommend the introduction of a certification process.230
England and Wales-Case management is an essential part of
group litigation in England and Wales 231 as a means of managing the
complexity of the proceedings and as a way of ensuring that the apous payments were made to the class representative's lawyers. See, e.g., In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
226. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 46, at 146.
227. The first requirement is that seven or more persons have claims against the same person. The second requirement is that the claims are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar
or related circumstances. The final prerequisite is that the claims of the group give rise to a
substantial common issue of law or fact. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s
33C1; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) pt 4A s 33C1 (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt
10 s 157(1) (Austl.).
228. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA s 33N(1)(d); Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic) pt 4A s 33N(1)(d) (Austl.); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) pt 10 s 166(1)(e) (Austl.).
229. Bright v Femcare Ltd. [2002] 195 ALR 574, 607 (Austl.). A year later, Justice Finkelstein again indicated that "many class actions become bogged down by interminable and expensive interlocutory applications and protracted and even more expensive appeals from
interlocutory orders." Bray v F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. [2003] 200 ALR 607, 660 (Austl.); see
also [2004] FCA 1637 (Austl.).
230. See, e.g.,, MULHERON, Common Law Class Action, supra note 127, at 27-29; see also P
Dawson Nominees Pty. Ltd. v Multiplex Limited [2007] FCA 1061 para 18 (Austl.) (where Justice
Finkelstein noted that the "experience of class actions suggests that the absence of a certification
process is itself the cause of numerous interlocutory applications with resultant expense and
delay"). The situation might further be exacerbated by the introduction of pre-action protocols
requiring parties to undertake genuine steps to resolve the dispute including the exploration of
Alternative Dispute Resolution options before proceeding with litigation. Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Practice Note CM 17
(Austl.).
231. Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, r. 19.10 (U.K.) provides that a GLO
"means an order [...] to provide for the case management of claims which give rise to common
or related issues of fact or law (the 'GLO issues')" with further extensive case management
powers stipulated in CPR r. 19.13 (U.K.). See CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL REPORT, IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE

ACTIONS 161-62, available at http://www.americanbar.

org/conten t/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust-law/at800l75-improving-access.authcheckdam.pdf
(recommending that "collective claims should be subject to an enhanced form of case management by specialist judges").
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proach taken is consistent with the overriding objective. The need for
robust case management was highlighted by criticism of the procedures for managing group litigation in the period before group litigation orders became available, and it was recognized for complex
litigation in the 2007 Report and Recommendations of the Commercial
Court Long Trials Working Party. The Civil Justice Council's 2008 Report observed the similarities in nature between collective actions and
complex commercial claims and, accordingly, the need for a similar
approach to collective actions.
Specifically, in group litigation, five certification criteria must be
met: numerosity (there must be a "number of claims"); 232 commonality (these must give rise to "common or related issues of fact or
law"); 233 suitability (managing the litigation by means of a GLO must
be consistent with the overriding objective of the CPR, which is to
enable the court "to deal with cases justly"); 234 preliminary merits (the
consent of the Lord Chief Justice, the Vice-Chancellor, or the Head of
Civil Justice (whichever is appropriate), is required; 235 and superiority-a GLO will not be commenced if consolidation of the claims, or a
representative proceeding, would be more appropriate. 2 3 6 Representative actions require that claimants have the same interest and that
more than one person share the claim with the representative 237 and
actions framed as such are routinely challenged by defendants on this
basis.
The proposed Financial Services Bill contained several requirements for certification, including: commonality (the claim must raise
the "same, similar or related issues of fact or law" among class members); 238 a suitable representative (either an "ideological claimant" or
a directly-affected class member may bring the claim, if an "appropriate person"); 239 superiority (the collective proceedings for determining the claim must be the "most appropriate means for the fair and
efficient resolution of the common issues" and must be "appropriate
[to] further the overriding objective"); 24 0 minimum class size (an identifiable class of persons); 241 preliminary merits threshold (a claim that
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, r. 19.11 (U.K.).
Id. at r. 19.10, 19.11(1).
Id. at 1.1(1).
Id. at Practice Direction 19B, para. 3.3.
Id. at Practice Direction 19B, para. 2.3.
Id. at r. 19.6.
See Financial Services Bill, 2010, H.C. Bill 2010-12 (U.K.) (proposing CPR 19.21(3)).
Id.
Id. (proposing 19.20(2)(b)).
Id. (proposing 19.20(2)(a)).
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is weak, but not so weak that it could be struck out, could fail certification because, "in all the circumstances," it should not be certified); 242 a statement of truth (the representative claimant is required
to state in its application, verified by a statement of truth, that it believes that the claim has real prospects of success;2 43 and cost-benefit
test-the court must take into account "the costs and the benefits of
the proposed collective proceeding" when deciding whether the collective proceedings are the most appropriate means for the fair and
efficient resolution of the common issues.2 44 The proposed Financial
Services Bill 2010 also included provision for fairness hearings and
judicial approval of any proposed compromise or discontinuance of a
245
collective action.
Netherlands-To declare a WCAM settlement binding, the court
must determine whether the representative foundation or association
sufficiently represents the interests of the persons pursuant to its articles of association; whether the amount of compensation awarded in
the settlement agreement is reasonable2 46 (based on the extent and
possible cause of the damages suffered, whether payment is sufficiently guaranteed, and the ease and speed with which compensation
can be obtained); and whether interested parties have received adequate notification 247 (both for the purposes of objecting to a binding
declaration and for deciding whether they wish to opt-out. The latter
may be determined in a pre-trial hearing, during which the court may
order the notification to be done in some other way, as long as it respects international instruments on notification.2 48
The court must determine whether the agreement adequately describes the interested parties according to the nature and the seriousness of their loss; provides an accurate estimate of the number of
interested parties; and indicates the amounts of compensation, the
conditions to qualify for compensation, the procedure for establishing
and obtaining payment and the name and place of residence of the
interested parties for notification purposes. The court's authority to
alter the content of the settlement is limited to addressing the fairness
of the amount of compensation or the process of determining the
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. (proposing 19.20(2)(c)).
Id. (proposing 19.18(3)(c)).
Bill, 2010, H.C. Bill 2010-12 (U.K.) (proposing 19.20(3)(a)).
Id. (proposing 19.37).
BW [Civil Code], bk. 7, art. 907(3)(b), 907(3)(f) (Neth.).
Rv [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 1013 (Neth.).
Rv [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 1013(5) (Neth.).
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compensation. The court is not allowed to exclude a portion of the
interested parties.

Proposed reforms contemplate permitting the court to assist in
pre-trial appearances to identify the main points of dispute and to en-

courage parties to seek assistance from mediators. Supplementary
measures would stimulate the parties' willingness to negotiate, and fa-

cilitate the negotiation and the finalisation of settlement agreements.
A further reform would introduce a procedure for requesting prelimi-

nary rulings from the Dutch Supreme Court to clarify the negotiating
parties' legal positions.
Italy-Actions may be brought on a representative basis only if

the court declares them admissible pursuant to the requirements of
the Consumer Code. Admissibility may be denied if the action appears to be clearly groundless. The Italian legislation does not make

provision for the court to review settlements in class actions for their
fairness to the class members. It remains to be seen how the courts
will address this concern.
Belgium-The government proposal for class actions would confine them to the Brussels Court of First Instance and the Brussels
Court of Appeals2 49 to ensure that the necessary specialized expertise
is developed in the courts that handle them. 5° This would promote
efficient handling of cases, and the development of a uniform and predictable jurisprudence, particularly in view of the limited number of
mass cases in European countries.2 5 1
In terms of court involvement, it is important to note the adversarial character of Belgian civil procedure generally 252 with its respect
249. This reflects the approach in the Dutch Collective Settlements Acts, which makes the
Amsterdam Court of Appeals exclusively competent to approve collective settlements. The government proposal also provides for a "class action training" for the Brussels judges, and the
possibility that the court would travel as needed throughout the country. See Randall D. Lloyd,
Leonard B. Weinberg & Elizabeth Francis, An Exploration of State and Local Judge Mobility, 22
JusT. Sys. J. 19 (2001); George R. Pring & Catherine K. Pring, Specialized Environment Courts
and Tribunals at the Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment, 11 OR. REV. INT'L L.
301, 328 (2009).
250. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1465,

1517-18 (2004).
251. To date, there were 75 GLO procedures in England and Wales. Since the introduction in
2005 of the Dutch Collective Settlements Acts, there were 6 procedures. In Sweden there were
11 class action procedures in between 2003 and 2007.
252. See Piet Taelman & Stefaan Voet, Belgium and Collective Redress: the Last of the European Mohicans, in THE BELGIAN REPORTS AT THE CONGRESS OF WASHINGTON OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 309-11 (Eric Dirix & Yves-Henri Leleu eds.,
Bruylant 2011); see also Gerald. J. Meijer, Belgian Civil Procedure, in ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD 193-237 (Henk J. Snijders ed., Kluwer Law International, 1996); Jean Laenens &
Georges Van Mellaert, The Judicial System and Procedure,in INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW
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for party autonomy in framing the proceedings in terms of the claims
and parties, and the active role played by judges in case management 253 and, where the parties present insufficient evidence, in order-

ing a complementary inquiry.254 Existing case management tools, such
as the authority to impose a binding procedural calendar, to undertake ex officio a complementary inquiry, and to have an interactive
debate with the parties, and to impose fines in cases of misuse or
abuse of procedure, could be adapted for a group litigation procedure.
In addition, the court will need special powers, such as those for
discontinuing proceedings, substituting representative plaintiffs who
are not providing adequate representation, and establishing subgroups.2 5 Such tools are needed to ensure that the best interests of
the parties, including absent group members and the public, are
served and public confidence in group litigation is maintained. 256 The
current proposals have yet to include procedures for matters such as
additional notice, imposing additional conditions on the class representative or class attorney, and allowing individual class members to
be involved in the procedure. These will be important features of a
well-functioning group litigation regime.
Sweden- In Sweden, group actions may proceed as such only
with the approval of a court, which is granted provided that: the action
is based on one or more common or similar circumstances or matters
of law among the claims of the group members; a group action is the
best available procedure to litigate the majority of the claims (superiority); the group is adequately defined; that the financial affairs of the
group representative are in good order and the representative is suitable; and, with few exceptions, that the plaintiffs are represented by a
member of the bar. 5 7 The requirement of representation by a member of the bar is unique to class actions in Swedish civil procedure.
83-110 (H. Bocken ed., Kluwer Law International 2001);Paul Lefebvre, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 75-96 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., Kluwer Law International 2003).
253. Benoit Allemeersch, Civil Case Management. The Belgian Debate and Reforms, in THE
XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN

AND

DUTCH

REPORTS

237

(A.W. Jongbloed ed., Intersentia 2008).
254. Consisting, for example, in the submission of certain documents, witness testimony, an
official visit to the scene of the facts, the personal appearance of the parties in the court, etc.
255. Vince Morabito, Ideological Plaintiffs and Class Actions. An Australian Perspective, 34
U.B.C. L. REV. 459, 494-95 (2000-2001).
256. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Pitt Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 747 (2002); Catherine Pich6, Judging Fairnessin Class Action Settlements, 28 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST.111, 111-12 (2010).
257. 8 § SGPA (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.).
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Notices to the group members2 58 and appeals 25 9 are also subject
to judicial approval to protect group members, the defendant, and the
court from abuse, as are settlements in order for them to be binding
on the group. Approval for settlements depends upon them not being
discriminatory against some group members or otherwise obviously
unreasonable.2 6 ° In addition, costs shifting and the absence of contingency fees safeguard against abuse, and "risk agreements" (conditional
fees) are binding only if approved as reasonable in view of the nature
of the litigation.
6.

Compatibility with U.S.-style Class Actions

Canada-Canadian class actions have been modelled on U.S.
class actions, but it has been thought that some of the excesses of
U.S.-style litigation have been avoided due to differences in the legal
culture. Although many consumer and securities claims are follow-on
actions to U.S. proceedings, counsel fees and settlement awards have
been more restrained, in part due to the absence of jury trials, treble
damages awards, and a more conservative judiciary. Owing to the extensive economic engagement between the two countries, as mentioned, there have been many parallel and overlapping claims, and a
number of them have involved informal coordination either among
counsel, or between courts. In 2011, the American Bar Association
approved protocols for notice and for court-to-court communications
26 1
to facilitate the process of coordinating parallel actions.
Australia-The government of Australia has acknowledged that
class actions have become an important part of the Australian justice
system 262 by enhancing the community's access to justice. 263 Uniondriven class actions have enabled thousands of workers to receive
compensation,2 64 and Australia's two major regulators, ASIC and
ACCC, have employed the Federal class action regime to fulfil their
258. 13, 24, 49, 59 § SGPA.
259. 42, 48 § SGPA.
260. 26 § SGPA.
261. Consultation Paper: Canadian Judicial Protocol for the Management of Multijurisdictional Class Actions, available athttp://www.cba.org/CBA/ClassActionsTaskForce/PDF/Consultation-eng.pdf.
262. Hon. Chris Bowen, Minister for Fin. Servs., Superannuation & Corporate Law, Address
to Shareholder Class Action Conference (May 4, 2010) available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.
au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2010/005.htm&pagelD=005&min=ceba&Year=&Doc
Type=1.
263. Id.
264. See Jane Caruana & Vince Morabito, Australian Unions - The Unknown Class Action
Protagonists,30 CIv. JUST. Q. (forthcoming 2011).
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mandates. 2 65 In view of the fact that they are modelled on U.S.-style
class actions, it would seem that, in principle, they are compatible with
them.
England and Wales-To the extent that U.S.-style class actions
are characterized by an opt-out regime, with the possibility of aggregate assessment of damages, a cy pros damages distribution, with certification, and with a fairness hearing in the event of settlement, no such
regime exists in England and Wales, although such a regime was contemplated in the previously proposed reforms to the Financial Services Act.2 66 The considerable criticism that has been made of U.S.style class actions has been decried by the Civil Justice Council as misplaced in that U.S. litigation operates on a different footing with limited cost-shifting, broad discovery rights, jury trials, percentage-based
contingency fees, and punitive damages.2 6 7 Whether a regime of collective redress similar to that found in the United States, Canada, and
Australia can be introduced into the English civil justice system remains to be seen.
Netherlands-The WCAM does not create a U.S.-style class action, but a mechanism for approving settlements in collective actions
that would bind potential claimants on an opt-out basis. It relies on
the fact that most class actions in the U.S., Canada, and Australia are
settled. To date, five such settlements have been approved and a sixth
has sought approval. Several have involved foreign elements and, significantly, some have enabled European affected persons or interested
parties who were excluded from U.S. class actions and settlements to
obtain compensation.26 8 While the WCAM is designed to be compatible with U.S.-style class actions and has brought the benefit of some
class actions to Europe, the decision not to establish U.S.-style class
actions is thought to reflect the culture of Dutch pragmatism favouring practical solution through harmonious negotiations rather than expensive confrontation in mass litigation in court proceedings.
Italy-Italian class actions differ from their American counterparts in a number of ways, including the requirement that class mem265. E.g., Australian Comp. & Consumer Comm'n v Chats House Inv. Pty. Ltd. (1998) 83
FCR 424 (Austl.).
266. Financial Services Bill, 2010, H.C. Bill 2010-12 cl. 18-25 (U.K.).
267. IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS, 38-41
(John Sorabji et al. eds., 2008).
268. See In re Royal Dutch / Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 721 (D.N.J. 2007);
Hof 29 mei 2009, NJ 2009, 506 m.nt. J.M.J. Chorus, M.P. van Achterberg en W.H.F.M. (Shell
Petroleum N.V./Dexia Bank Nederland N.V.) (Neth.); In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig.,
537 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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bers opt in, the lack of specialized arrangements for funding and
financing, and fairness hearings for settlements. However, any concern raised by the underdeveloped nature of class actions must be
placed in the larger context of an inefficient civil justice system. Nevertheless, as indicated by an EU Commission working document, Toward a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, 69 the
challenges posed by the sheer variety of legal systems might best be
addressed by a common approach to collective redress, one that might
assist national legal systems in finding the way forward.
Belgium-Class actions are seen in Belgium as a supplement to
existing methods of dealing with mass harms and are accepted only
when they are superior to other available methods for adjudicating a
controversy. 270 Their role must be understood in the context of the
panoply of other public, private, and administrative resources 27a in the
form of complaint boards, criminal prosecutions with the possibility of
ancillary relief for victims, and governmental regulatory bodies, such
as in the field of competition law. Belgian class actions, where they are
necessary, would operate differently than U.S.-style class actions because they would be embedded in a different procedural culture, with
different rules on standing, funding and financing litigation, and court
involvement. They would be required to be initiated by an ideological
plaintiff; they could not be funded on a contingency fee basis; and they
would be required to be dealt with by one competent court. However,
Belgian class actions would seek to achieve the same objectives as
U.S.-style class actions and would offer claims for injunctive and monetary relief.
269. EUROPEAN COMM'N, TOWARDS A COHERENT EUROPEAN APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE
4
REDRESS (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting-public/OO5 /sec_2011_
173_en.pdf.
270. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
271. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE 235

(Hart Publishing 2008) (suggesting a ranking of the different options: first voluntary settlement;
then regulatory oversight; and finally judicial supervision (including private enforcement tools as
class actions)); see also WILLEM H. VAN BOOM & MARCO Loos, COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSUMER LAW. SECURING COMPLIANCE IN EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATE GROUP ACTION AND

PUBLIC AUTHORITY INTERVENTION (Europa Law Publ'g 2007). Also in the United States, some
authors point out that there are public legal protection tools as valuable alternatives for class
actions, especially in small claims cases. See Steven B. Malech & Robert E. Koosa, Government

Action and the Superiority Requirement: A Potential Bar to Private Class Action Lawsuits, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1419 (2005); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
71; see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTILEMENT (Univ. of Chi.

Press 2007).
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Sweden-In assessing the compatibility of the regimes, it must be
borne in mind that the courts have played less of a role in the reform
of legal rights than other means of dispute resolution and behavior
modification. This may be partly due to a concern that litigation is not

necessarily the most equitable means of determining the right of consumers and others and partly to a historical lack of confidence in the
willingness of courts and judges to participate actively in building the
welfare state based on the Social Democratic model. This coupled

with a limited scope for judicial lawmaking and judicial review, has
reduced the influence of Swedish courts in civil matters and limited
the tendency to litigate. However, there are signs that this might be
changing with an increased role for the courts and new functions for
civil procedure ahead.2 72
Differences between U.S.-style class actions and the Swedish

group action, such as costs-shifting; the absence of contingency fees
strictu sensu and state and private funding mechanisms; the opt-in requirement; the lack of pretrial discovery, post-trial calculation mecha-

nisms, cy pros awards, punitive damages, and standardized
computation of damages have reduced the effectiveness of the group
litigation procedure. Further constraints exist in the poor regard for
the procedure among insurers, some groups in the bar, and some conservative judges and politicians. This poor regard has caused many to
favour alternative dispute resolution as an easily accessible, flexible,
fast, and low-cost way for parties to resolve disputes, as well as a

means of reducing judicial workload. This is not without controversy.
ADR is a valuable complement to civil litigation (including group ac-

tions), 273 but some have expressed concern that in serving as a surrogate, ADR may diminish the role of the courts and threaten the
functions of civil procedure. 4
272. See Per Henrik Lindblom, The Growing Role of the Courts and the new Functions of
Judicial Process - Fact or Flummery?, 51 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 281 (2007).

273. Settlement and arbitration. In Carl de Geer v. Luftfartsverket [Carl de Geer v. Swedish
Airports & Air Navigation Serv.] [Nacka District Court, Environmental Court Division] 2007
M1931(Swed.) residents of a community near Arlanda Airport, formed a non-profit organization
called "Residents of Visby Against Aviation Noise" to bring a private group action against the
Swedish Airports and Air Navigation Service (LFV), seeking damages for injury caused by aviation noise on behalf of about 20,000 people, mainly residents of one neighbourhood adjacent to
the airport. The District Court issued the summons and about 7,000 people have opted in so far.
LFV moved to dismiss, arguing that the conditions of SGPA §8 had not been met. The court
denied the motion in January 2009. The parties subsequently commenced settlement negotiations, which are still ongoing (September 2011). LINDBLOM, supra note 34, at 7.

274. See Per Henrik Lindblom, ADR - the Opiate of the Legal System?, 16 EUROPEAN REV.
PRIVATE L. 63 (2008). But see Bengt Lindell, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Administration of Justice - Basic Principles,51 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 311, 322 (2007).
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III.

CLASS ACTIONS
FURTHER REFLECTIONS: WHAT ARE WE (THEY) AFRAID OF?

This study sought to go beyond a U.S. perspective on the differences in approaches to collective regimes by surveying comparatists
from various legal systems about specific aspects of collective redress
that might shape their perceptions of U.S. class actions. However, designing a survey of perceptions on the cultural dimensions of a controversial procedure such as class actions can be fraught with unexpected
pitfalls. Among the more significant are those that can arise in tackling the challenge of sample selection. To receive pertinent and insightful responses in a comparative study of the specifics of complex
procedural mechanisms, such as those comprising systems for collective redress, it is necessary to consult reporters with significant insight
into the range of procedural options and configurations that exist
across legal systems. Accordingly, the reports in this study were
sought from knowledgeable comparatists.
On receiving the reports, it became apparent that the strong reaction that seemed routinely to be provoked by the discussion of U.S.style class actions in many international settings was strangely muted.
One explanation for this could be that the hostility and anxiety of
those who would resist reforms that might bring a legal system closer
to the U.S. model was borne largely of ignorance.
Writing more than a decade ago, Michele Taruffo, said that "the
European rejection of class actions-essentially based upon ignorance-has usually been justified by the necessity of preventing such a
monster from penetrating the quiet European legal gardens."2'7 5 To
varying degrees, the experience and insight that the reporters in this
study have gained from their own work on class actions in comparative context seemed to have set them apart from other less informed
members of their legal systems. Indeed, in the European Parliament
Resolution of 2 February 2012 on "Towards a Coherent European
Approach to Collective Redress,' 276 "stresse[d] that Europe must refrain from introducing a US-style class action system or any system
2 77
which does not respect European legal traditions.
275. Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 11
DUKE J.CONST. L & PUB. POL'Y 405, 414 (2001).
276. European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on 'Towards a Coherent European
Approach to Collective Redress', EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-/EP/TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0021+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
277. Id.

564

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18

Even if these reporters' views were not developed in concert with
one another, their views have been shaped by an appreciation of the
range of options for the various features of collective redress regimes
and the implications of the choices that might be made among these
options. In contrast with other members of their legal communities,
who have been reluctant to support reforms that might engender the
entrepreneurial lawyering and other unwanted features associated
with American civil litigation, these reporters seemed impatient with
the slow progress of such reforms.
Despite this, these reporters were not naive about the challenges
of reform. The reporters in this study were sufficiently knowledgeable
to appreciate that adapting class actions to fit the local legal culture
(and yet to operate effectively) would require considerable ingenuity
in process design-more than that required simply for implementation. 78
Perhaps, in the end, there remains a fundamental difference in
views over the merits of commodifying of legal rights in the course of
their vindication. In their incisive 2009 analysis of the concerns about
U.S.-style class actions, Professors Issacharoff and Miller identified
their core concern as follows: "that an apparent cultural revulsion at
accepting the reality of legal enforcement as entrepreneurial activity
may leave the reforms without the necessary agents of implementation. '279 However, whether legal enforcement is ultimately an essentially entrepreneurial activity is far from clear to most observers
outside the United States.
It is not clear that legal enforcement is ultimately an essentially
entrepreneurial activity particularly in the civil law, where the development and resolution of civil disputes are placed primarily in the
hands of the courts, who are viewed as public officials. In the civil law,
cases are resolved when justice is dispensed by the state through the
courts applying the laws that have been passed by the legislature.
They are not resolved as a product of a monetary compromise negotiated between those responsible for the harm and class counsel seeking
a substantial fee.
Neither is it clear that legal enforcement is ultimately an essentially entrepreneurial activity in other parts of the common law world.
278. Cf Christopher Smithka, From Budapest to Berlin: How Implementing Class Action
Lawsuits in the European Union Would Increase Competition and Strengthen Consumer Confidence, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 173 (advocating implementation of class actions confident that the
absence of punitive damages and excessive attorneys fees would suffice to avert the abuses
feared).
279. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 1 at 181.
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In other common law countries the principle of party prosecution is
tempered, at least in the perception of the public, by the belief that
even class actions operate primarily to promote access to justice as
understood in the traditional sense, and that the monetary outcome of
a civil dispute is not the only or best purpose or measure of its success.
Perhaps even more importantly are the two further questions
raised by the question of whether litigation is really only about
money. The first is whether, as Issacharoff and Miller suggest, introducing the kinds of economic incentives that drive U.S.-style class actions is an inevitable requirement for the effective functioning of a
collective redress regime. The second is whether fashioning the legal
enforcement of collective rights as an entrepreneurial activity necessarily reduces the sense of doing justice in resolving disputes through
group litigation to what some have considered to be a bare knuckle
negotiation between a business that has caused widespread harm and
a team of avaricious lawyers.
Given the enormously complex matrix of procedural mechanisms
and features of the economic and professional context in which class
actions operate, it may well be that the only way to find the answers to
these questions is to implement reform and observe the results. The
difficulty is, as the American experience has demonstrated, this is a
kind of learning that, like the knowledge in the Platonic dialogue, cannot be unlearned.2 8 0 Indeed, a significant feature of the American
comparative jurisprudence is the reflection on the many concerns arising from the excesses of U.S. class actions and the measures that have
been taken to curb them.
Perhaps, then, the only prudent approach to reforms of collective
redress regimes outside the United States is to take these two questions in that order, i.e., by first testing for efficacy, and only then for
suitability; and by testing for efficacy in the negative. In other words,
if entrepreneurship is an inevitable reality for effective legal enforcement, there is no need to lunge forward to embrace it-its necessity
will eventually become apparent. Instead, adopting reforms that are
consistent with a country's legal culture, whether or not the reforms
are effective, makes it possible to evaluate their efficacy and adjust the
economic incentives as needed. This is arguably what has happened in
Canada and Australia where attitudes to counsel fees and third party
280. In Protagoras,Socrates warns Hippocrates about the teachings of Protagoras, which he
says unlike fruit in the market, cannot be purchased and then examined before being consumed once learned, the teachings become part of one. Plato, Protagoras,in PROTAGORAS AND MENO
(W. C. K. Guthrie trans., Penguin Books 1956).

566

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18

financing have gradually evolved as the justification for reform has
been demonstrated on a case-by-case basis.
Approaching reform in this way eliminates the need to discover
that certain reforms are unsuitable for a particular legal culture. Experimenting with potentially unsuitable transplants could leave a legal
system with an unpopular procedure that harms the reputation of the
administration of justice, but that has engaged an entrenched interest
on the part of a sector of the legal profession that makes it difficult to
withdraw.
On further reflection, there may be emerging another option: that
of a companion procedure that does not seek to replicate U.S.-style
class actions, but to provide the benefits of them to the would-be parties to matters that would otherwise be resolved in this way. With the
recent settlement approval by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the
Converium case, Europe has just witnessed its first opt-out multi-jurisdictional group litigation judgment. In principle, this judgment will enjoy recognition throughout Europe under the Brussels I Regulation.
Any analysis from a U.S. perspective of the WCAM procedure
based on the checks and balances that have been developed for U.S.
class actions would probably conclude that it is likely to fail. Reducing
the entire collective redress process to a single procedure-that of settlement approval-the procedure that is treated with the most circumspection in the United States, seems hardly a promising way to
construct a regime that will operate with integrity. Add to that the
requirement that the negotiation not be conducted with a lawyer
whose economic interests likely coincide with those of the claimants,
but with a nonprofit organization whose interests may reflect idiosyncratic ideological considerations, and the WCAM procedure seems, at
least from a U.S. perspective, dubious at best.
And yet, as a purely derivative procedure-one that relies for its
operation on the existence of parallel class litigation in the United
States or elsewhere-the WCAM process may be a suitable way to
localize the process of collective redress in a multijurisdictional claim.
Whether it succeeds in providing closure for defendants remains to be
seen. Whether it succeeds in providing claimants with a sense of vindication remains to be seen. Nevertheless, contrary to all the projections that might be constructed out of the U.S. class actions
experience for a successful collective redress regime, the WCAM procedure seems to be one that promises to inspire the most confidence
and, possibly, the least fear among those who seem most afraid of
U.S.-style class actions.

